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An Experimental Bribery Game 总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7
Abbink Klaus; Irlenbusch Bernd; Renner Elke 《Jnl. of Law, Economics, and Organization》2002,18(2):428-454
Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocityrelationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negativewelfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. Weseparate the influences of these factors in an experiment. Ina two-player game, reciprocation is economically inefficientthrough negative externalities. A control treatment withoutexternalities is also conducted. In a third, so-called suddendeath treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusionfrom the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocitycan establish bribery relationships, where negative externalitieshave no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reducescorruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated. 相似文献
2.
In spring 2000, the British government auctioned off licences for Third Generation mobile telecommunications services. In the preparation of the auction, two designs involving each a hybrid of an English and a sealed-bid auction were considered by the government: A discriminatory and a uniform price variant. We report an experiment on these two designs, and also compare the results to those with a pure English auction. Both hybrids are similar in efficiency, revenue differences disappear as bidders get experienced. Compared to the discriminatory format, the pure English auction induces more entry. 相似文献
3.
Asymmetric Demand Information in Uniform and Discriminatory Call Auctions: An Experimental Analysis Motivated by Electricity Markets 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We study experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty, motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. We study the effect of asymmetric demand-information in the two auction institutions. In our treatment condition some sellers have less information than in our baseline conditions. In both conditions transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, under asymmetric information discriminatory auctions are significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower prices and less volatility. 相似文献
4.
Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental
tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical
bribery context, the other one uses abstract wording. Though the underlying context is heavily loaded with negative ethical
preconceptions, we do not find significant differences with our 18 independent observations per treatment. We conjecture that
the experimental design transmits the essential features of a bribery situation already with neutral framing, such that the
presentation does not add substantially to subjects’ interpretation of the task.
JEL Classification C91 · D62 · D72 · D73 · K42 相似文献
5.
Klaus Abbink Lars Christian Moller Sarah O’Hara 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2010,45(2):283-318
With the disintegration of the USSR a conflict arose between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan over the transboundary
Syr Darya river. Upstream Kyrgyzstan controls the Toktogul reservoir which generates hydropower demanded mainly in winter
for heating. Downstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan need irrigation water in summer, primarily to grow an export crop (cotton).
Regional agreements obliging Kyrgyzstan to higher summer discharges in exchange for fossil fuel transfers from downstream
riparians in winter have been unsuccessful, due to lack of trust between the parties. Striving for self-sufficiency in irrigation
water, Uzbekistan initiated new reservoir construction. This paper examines their economic impact. We report a laboratory
experiment modelling the Syr Darya scenario as a multi-round, three-player trust game with non-binding contracts. Payoff schemes
are estimated using real-life data. While basinwide efficiency maximisation requires regional cooperation, our results demonstrate
that cooperation in the laboratory is hard to achieve. Uzbek reservoirs improve cooperation only weakly and their positive
impact is limited to low-water years. 相似文献
6.
In this article it will be demonstrated how a simple static Computable General Equilibrium model of the Indonesian economy can be constructed using the Social Accounting Matrix as a database. It will be shown that under a few assumptions the constant labour force and capital stock in the static model can be elaborated to dynamic specifications. In both static and dynamic versions the effects of productivity increases are investigated, leading to the conclusion that with respect to income and employment generating effects innovating sectors are worse off than non-innovating sectors due to low elasticities of demand. [D58, O33] 相似文献
7.
We report an experiment on a decision task by Samuelson and Bazerman (1985). Subjects submit a bid for an item with an unknown value. A winners curse phenomenon arises when subjects bid too high and make losses. Learning direction theory can account for this. However, other influences on behaviour can also be identified. We introduce impulse balance theory to make quantitative predictions on the basis of learning direction theory. We also look at monotonic ladder processes. It is shown that for this kind of Markov chains the impulse balance point is connected to the mode of the stationary distribution. 相似文献
8.
Within the German federal government regular staff rotation is a precautionary measure against corruption in public administration. To study the effect of this policy, an experiment was conducted where pairs of potential bribers and public officials were randomly re-matched in every round. The outcome is compared to the case where the identity of the pairs interacting remained fixed. The conclusion is that rotation of interacting pairs significantly reduces the levels of bribes as well as the frequency of inefficient decisions due to bribery. 相似文献
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