Relative consumption and renewable resource extraction under alternative property-rights regimes

This paper presents a simple model of resource extraction where preferences are defined over the individual’s consumption level, her effort and the comparison of her consumption with that of other members of the community. Our specification captures the intuition that lies behind the growing body of empirical evidence that places interpersonal comparisons as a key determinant of well-being. We consider the effect of consumption externalities under two alternative property-rights regimes: perfect property rights and open access. We identify two dimensions along which consumption externalities distort the efficient exploitation of resources, or, in the case of open access, aggravate the over-exploitation of resources: (i) the static trade-off between consumption and leisure, and (ii) the dynamic trade-off between current and future consumption. In general, envious agents over-exploit the natural resource stock, resulting in a steady-state stock lower than the efficient level chosen by a central planner. We propose a tax mechanism to induce the first-best outcome.     

Habit Formation, Catching Up with the Joneses, and Economic Growth

Our objective is to investigate how alternative assumptions about preferences affect the process of economic growth. To do this, we analyze a neoclassical growth model under three alternative preference specifications: (i) time separable, (ii) catching up with the Joneses, and (iii) habit formation. Departing from the time separable specification leads to important differences in the dynamic structure, the adjustment path followed by key economic variables, the correlation patterns implied by the time series generated by the model, and the speed of convergence to the new steady state. In the catching up with the Joneses economy the differences arise from a consumption externality, while in the habit formation economy the difference arises from the fact that agents not only smooth consumption but also its rate of change.     

Envy, leisure, and restrictions on working hours

Abstract.  We present a simple model of capital accumulation where agents care about their consumption relative to the consumption of other members of society, 'envy,' In this context we quantify the extent of the distortions and welfare costs associated with envy. Under conservative estimates of envy we find that the implied welfare losses are substantial. We explore the implications of alternative policy arrangements designed to minimize the effects of the consumption externality. Our results suggest that if the optimal tax policy is not politically feasible, restrictions on working hours provide an alternative tool to induce a market outcome that resembles the efficient allocation achieved under a benevolent central planner. JEL classification: D62, H21     

Growth outside the stable path: Lessons from the European reconstruction

This paper exploits a natural experiment, the large destruction of capital in continental Europe during World War II, to characterize the transitional dynamics of an economy that begins with a capital stock below its steady state level. We use these regularities as a benchmark to discriminate among competing growth specifications. A model that combines non-separabilities in preferences with a technology that restricts the degree of substitutability between inputs outperforms the widely used AK and Cobb–Douglas specifications with time-separable preferences. Our results suggest that policy evaluations based in growth models that overlook non-separabilities in preferences or impose strong restrictions on the technological structure might be grossly misleading.