Soil Fertility Management and Compost Use in Senegal's Peanut Basin

The Jóór (Dior) soils of Senegal's Peanut Basin are inherently low in organic matter, limiting yields of millet and other crops and threatening the food security of smallholders. Focus groups and interviews were conducted in eight villages to characterise the site-specific fertility management by farmers in the Peanut Basin. Results of the qualitative survey revealed that farmers base management decisions on a series of fertility indicators that include type, colour, and texture of soil, presence of vegetation, and productivity in previous years. In an effort to equalise fertility across the field, farmers amend areas they classify as less fertile with decomposed manure and household waste from the family sëntaare (traditional pile) orwith compost from managed piles. On-site measurements of soil in areas of fields amended with compost or sëntaare material revealed significant increases in peanut and millet growth over unamended areas, but little difference between the effects of compost and manure. Similarly, chemical analysis revealed increased effective cation exchange capacity (ECEC) and nutrient concentrations (K, Mg and Al) in soils amended with compost or manure. Similarities in the chemical characteristics of compost and sëntaare material suggest that development workers could emphasise improved pile management rather than promoting more labour-intensive composting.     

Discipline, Signaling, and Currency Boards

The paper models the choice between currency boards (CBs) and adjustable pegs (or managed floating). Countries adopting CBs have grown faster and inflated less on average than countries adopting other regimes. The explanation hinges on key features of CBs: policy discipline and inflation credibility. The authors find separating equilibria in which a weak government chooses a CB as a discipline device while a tough government chooses a standard peg for its policy flexibility. Paradoxically, the weak government can then outperform the tough government on average. In simulations performed, CBs welfare can exceed peg welfare even when unemployment persistence is strong.     

On the effects of incentive framing on bribery: evidence from an experiment in Burkina Faso

While incentive framing has been shown to promote workers’ effort, little is known about how it affects other dimensions of the employer-employee relationship. This paper examines whether incentive framing can also influence workers propensity to engage in an activity disloyal to their employer: corruption. To do so, we conducted an experiment in which graders are offered a bribe to report a better grade. Three treatments are conducted by framing economically equivalent contracts as menus of bonuses, penalties, or bonuses and penalties. We find that graders are more corrupt when incentives are framed as a combination of bonuses and penalties, while no difference is found between the bonus and the penalty contracts. These results are inconsistent with both standard economic theory and labor reciprocity.     

Rethinking contextual ambidexterity through parallel structures

This paper offers an alternative perspective on achieving contextual ambidexterity in organizations. Building on a collaborative research project within Renault’s Innovation Department, we identified that the corporate Fab Lab acted as a parallel structure in support of contextual ambidexterity. These findings provide three main contributions. First, we locate a source of contextual ambidexterity outside of the traditional business unit. In doing so, we challenge the dominant focus on managers, and show that, despite non-supportive contexts, employees can demonstrate ambidextrous skills through individual autonomous initiatives and bootlegging behaviors. Second, we delineate four key functions and related features – spatial, technical, methodological, and cultural – of parallel structures that nurture contextual ambidexterity. Finally, we recommend that the facilitation of a parallel structure should combine both flexibility and stability.     

FRAMING OF INCENTIVES AND EFFORT PROVISION

A prospect theory model combining loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity predicts that the link between incentives framing and effort is ambiguous: small penalties yield higher effort, but isomorphic contracts with large penalties decrease effort. We conduct two experiments (a framed field and a conventional lab experiment) in which economically equivalent contracts are framed as menus of either (i) bonuses, (ii) penalties, or (iii) bonuses and penalties. The experimental results confirm the main intuition of the model as subjects performed best when bonuses and penalties are combined. A follow‐up lottery experiment confirms that both loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity influenced the performance.     

Rice market integration and food security in Nepal: The role of cross-border trade with India

Coarse rice market integration between Nepal and India is analyzed applying a threshold autoregressive model. The price response behaviour of traders is found to be consistent with an asymmetric price adjustment mechanism, indicating coarse rice prices in Nepal respond to shocks originating in India. The results show that adjustments to negative price deviations from long-run stable equilibrium are faster than adjustments to the positive ones given a null threshold. Given that trade flows mainly from India to Nepal, Nepali traders would adjust their prices upward to align with the long-run equilibrium value relatively more quickly in the case of negative price deviations, than if the price deviations were positive. Such a high speed of adjustment to negative price deviations could be detrimental to net food buyers’ food security status in the absence of a price stabilization mechanism. However, a price stabilization policy in Nepal, a food deficit and import dependent country, would hardly have any effect on prices unless further effort is made to build up the level of national food reserves for short-term food security interventions. In the current context of structurally low levels of national food reserves, an alternative short-term policy such as foreign aid, in the form of food or income transfers, targeting the most vulnerable households to price increases is necessary through social safety net programmes. In the long-run, an improvement of transportation infrastructure between market hubs (other than the Biratnagar trade basin) in the Terai (Nepal) and India would contribute to the reduction of transaction costs and create incentives for more competition in formal cross-border trade with India. In times of negative shocks such as the high food price crisis in 2008, restrictive food trade policies in India will continue to undermine household food security in Nepal.     

Ownership structure and risk in publicly held and privately owned banks

Using detailed ownership data for a sample of European commercial banks, we analyze the link between ownership structure and risk in both privately owned and publicly held banks. We consider five categories of shareholders that are specific to our dataset. We find that ownership structure is significant in explaining risk differences but mainly for privately owned banks. A higher equity stake of either individuals/families or banking institutions is associated with a decrease in asset risk and default risk. In addition, institutional investors and non-financial companies impose the riskiest strategies when they hold higher stakes. For publicly held banks, changes in ownership structure do not affect risk taking. Market forces seem to align the risk-taking behavior of publicly held banks, such that ownership structure is no longer a determinant in explaining risk differences. However, higher stakes of banking institutions in publicly held banks are associated with lower credit and default risk.     

A controlled field experiment on corruption

This paper reports on a controlled field experiment on corruption designed to address two important issues: the experimenter's scrutiny and the unobservability of corruption. In the experiment, a grader is offered a bribe along with a demand for a better grade. We find that graders respond more favorably to bigger bribes, while the effect of higher wages is ambiguous: it lowers the bribe's acceptance, but it fosters reciprocation. Monitoring and punishment can deter corruption, but we cannot reject that it may also crowd-out intrinsic motivations for honesty when intensified. Finally, our results suggest several micro-determinants of corruption including age, ability, religiosity, but not gender.     

Falling under the control of a different type of owner:risk-taking implications for banks

European banks have experienced significant changes in the type of entity that owns them (another bank, an individual or a family, a non-financial company, an institutional investor, a government, a foreign entity, a domestic entity…). In this paper, we look at the influence of ownership type changes on risk and profitability. Working with a panel of commercial banks from 17 European countries, we find that although banks that experience a change in ownership type do not exhibit lower or higher risk or profitability than other banks, their risk and profitability is significantly affected after the change takes place. The type of the acquirer plays a significant role in explaining the observed changes. When the acquirer is a non-financial company, the state or an institutional investor, the level of risk increases after the change while the level of profitability remains unchanged. Conversely, when the acquirer is a bank, we find that the level of risk-adjusted profitability decreases. Banks acquired by a different type of owner during the global financial crisis do not perform better or worse than they did before.