Teaching business ethics: Questioning the assumptions,seeking new directions

An examination of leading textbooks suggests the predominance of a principle-based model in the teaching of business ethics. The model assumes that by teaching students the rudiments of ethical reasoning and ethical theory, we can hope to create rational, independent, autonomous managers who will apply such theory to the many quandary situations of the corporate world. This paper challenges these assumptions by asking the following questions: 1. Is the acquisition of principle-based ethical theory unproblematic? 2. What is the transferability of classroom learning to the business context? 3. Is it appropriate to consider complementary models in the teaching of business ethics? The last question is approached from the perspective of virtues-based ethics, from the insights of feminist ethics, and from a culturally grounded orientation to moral values and norms.     

Public policy for reducing tax evasion: implications of the Yule–Simpson paradox

The current study exhibits a new implication of the Yule–Simpson paradox with public policy repercussions. We construct Laffer curves of local property tax collection based on aggregated data and group division to residential land uses in Jerusalem. Results indicate that based on aggregated (dis-aggregated) data, the location of owner-occupiers and renters who pay a relatively high rate tariff will be on the upward-sloping (downward-sloping) part of the Laffer curve. Consequently, statistical test outcomes support Laffer’s controversial claim that for the few upper-brackets taxpayers, an efficient collection is associated with tax reduction rather than tax increase.     

Salvation by good works? Offshoring,corporate philanthropy,and public attitudes toward trade policy

American consumers are routinely reminded of the fact that the products sold by American companies are often manufactured abroad. We use a survey‐based priming experiment to explore whether and when those reminders depress Americans’ enthusiasm for free trade. We consider in particular that offshoring's effects on policy preferences may be linked to negative perceptions of the offshoring firm, such that portraying the offshoring firm in a positive light might mitigate that effect. We also consider that offshoring's effect may be exaggerated among individuals whose position in the labor market makes them especially sensitive to trade‐related labor market disruption. Our experiment suggests support for both propositions.     

The Chicken and Egg Problem: Obesity and the Urban Monocentric Model

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Recent medical studies have examined ways to offer enhanced spatial planning opportunities to increase a person’s level of physical...     

Städteranking: Dynamik von Städten und strukturelle Pfadabhängigkeit

The dynamics of cities is subject to structural path dependence. The authors demonstrate — using the HWWI/Berenberg Städteranking — that the socio economic development of most German cities is relatively constant in time. This has consequences for regional politics since structural changes depend on long-term planning, and therefore the results of political decisions can be observed only with a delay.     

Equilibrium joining probabilities for an M/G/1 queue

We study the customers' Nash equilibrium behavior in a single server observable queue with Poisson arrivals and general service times. Each customer takes a single decision upon arrival: to join or not to join. Furthermore, future regrets are not allowed. The customers are homogenous with respect to their linear waiting cost and the reward associated with service completion. The cost of joining depends on the behavior of the other customers present, which naturally forms a strategic game. We present a recursive algorithm for computing the (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium strategy. The algorithm's output is queue-dependent joining probabilities. We demonstrate that depending on the service distribution, this equilibrium is not necessarily unique. Also, we show that depending on the service time distribution, either the ‘avoid the crowd’ phenomenon or the ‘follow the crowd’ phenomenon may hold.     

Peace and Economic Interdependence in the Middle East

Can economic interdependence pacify the Middle East? While Middle Eastern countries have, for the most part, avoided the global trend of regionalism, this study provides empirical evidence that Middle Eastern countries with significant trade ties to other countries in the region do cooperate more and fight less. In addition to confirming the liberal notion of peace through trade, this study shows that several conditions outlined by the selectorate theory of political survival must be fulfilled if economic interdependence in the Middle East is to be achieved. A case study outlining Israeli and Turkish economic cooperation is used to show the selectorate model's regional compatibility. The regional applicability of the selectorate theory leads us to conclude that politically liberal countries are more likely to maintain economic relations with one another than with autocratic ones. Since liberal countries will be more economically interdependent with one another they will also be more peaceful towards one another. Ultimately, then, this study concludes that political liberalisation is one way of enhancing regional economic interdependence and consequently the prospects for a more peaceful Middle East.     

To obey or not to obey? Can game theory explain human behavior in the context of coronavirus disease?

The objective of the current study is to explain noncompliance to social distancing rules in Western societies in the absence of a stringent law enforcement mechanism and vaccines. In the first part of the analysis, an evolutionary game theory mechanism of two players is developed. The theoretical model assumes the existence of the prisoner's dilemma due to personal inconveniences associated with mask wearing, hand washing, and lockdowns. The model demonstrates that in the absence of sufficient law enforcement mechanism, and regardless of the initial strategy undertaken, one of the three potential equilibria solutions is the convergence of the system to defection of both players. In the second part of the analysis, based on the freedom-house measures, we provide empirical evidence supporting the notion that law enforcement efficiency is higher in autocratic countries. We show the perseverance of higher projected infection rates per 100,000 persons in democratic countries even 8 months after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the well-known inclination to cooperate more often than expected by game theory, this real-life outcome of noncompliance is remarkable. Moreover, the recent protests against lockdowns in China might reflect a shift from one equilibrium point (cooperation) to another (noncompliance).