A note on the decomposition (at a point) of aggregate excess demand on the Grassmannian

This paper analyzes the properties of aggregate excess demand functions for economies with an arbitrary finite set of N commodities where agents face trading restrictions of a general, abstract form: their budget set is defined by K-dimensional planes in ^N. It is shown that, if there are at least K agents in the economy, the only general property satisfied by the value of aggregate excess demand and its derivative, at any arbitrary point, is Walras Law. The result is established by considering an economy where agents' preferences are of a ‘generalized Leontief' type.     

A refinement of the core equivalence theorem

It is known that if blocking coalitions are restricted to be small relative to the size of the economy then the approximation of core allocations by competitive allocations can still be assured. This paper proves that the same type of approximation result is valid if the absolute size of the blocking coalition is bounded. The methods of Anderson (1978) are applied.     

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence of play (the period-by-period behavior as well as the long-run frequency) to Nash equilibria of the one-shot stage game, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random experimentation some recall, or memory, is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it suffices to recall the last two periods of play.     

On marginal cost pricing with given tax-subsidy rules

We provide an existence proof for Generalized Marginal Cost Pricing with given tax-subsidy rules. The novelty is that our approach allows for economic environments where all the generalized marginal cost pricing equilibria are inefficient in the aggregate. An example is recalled in order to suggest how non-pathological these environments are.     

Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games

It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibrium payoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.     

Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field

We explore the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for nontransferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution is to establish that theconsistent fieldis intimately related to the concept ofsubgame perfectionfor finite horizon noncooperative bargaining games, as the horizon goes to infinity and the cost of delay goes to zero. We then show that in the general NTU case—unlike the transferable utility and pure bargaining cases—the finite horizon subgame perfect equilibria need not approach the consistent value.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C72.