Designing high commitment — high performance organizations

In this paper the author suggests a number of reasons why in recent years there appears to have been a shift in thinking away from traditional bureaucratic-scientific forms of organization to alternative types of organizational design. In most cases, that thinking has yet to be translated into practial action. Experiments in organizational design are taking place but progress appears to be hindered by the lack of a sufficiently well understood design theory, a clearly existing model to emulate, and not least by a failure to know how we get from “where we are” to “where we want to be”. The author describes some of the basic characteristics of what have been called “high commitment—high performance” organizations, and concludes by offering a step-model towards the creation of such an organization.     

Network externalities and long-run market shares

We study a dynamic duopoly model with network externalities. The value of the product depends on the current and past network size. We compare the market outcome to a planner. With equal quality products, the market outcome may result in too little standardization (i.e. too many products active in the long run) but never too much. The potential inefficiency is non-monotonic in the strength of the network effect, being most likely for intermediate levels. When products differ in quality, an inferior product may dominate even when the planner would choose otherwise, but only if the discount factor is sufficiently large     

On the hellwig method of feasible portfolio construction

The work feasible portfolio is built into the work, that is, the k-dimensional Q column vector with components q_i where q_i 0 for i=1,...,k and q₁+...+q_k=1. We define i=1,...,k in the following way:

Sequential estimation of a location parameter and powers of a scale parameter from delayed observations

The problem of sequentially estimating a location parameter and powers of a scale parameter is considered in the case when the observations become available at random times. Certain classes of sequential estimation procedures are derived under an invariant balanced loss function and with the observation cost determined by a convex function of the stopping time and the number of observations up to that time.     

When Do Times of Increasing Uncertainty Call for Centralized Harmonization in International Policy Coordination?

Under what conditions do times of increasing uncertainty, such as the ongoing global turmoil, call for international policy harmonization? We shed light on this question by developing a model of interjurisdictional policy coordination taking place under incomplete information and featuring uncertainty about jurisdictions' politico-economic fundamentals. We show how the effect of an increase in uncertainty on the desirability of policy harmonization varies with the pattern of asymmetries in jurisdictions' scale, mutual influence, and magnitude of the increase in uncertainty. Our analysis suggests that the case for policy harmonization as a governance response to growing uncertainty is not compelling.     

Estimation of the equilibrium exchange rate: The CHEER approach

The paper presents the results of an investigation where the concept of a steady-state level of the exchange rate is equated with the capital market equilibrium based on the CHEER approach. The empirical analysis concentrates on Poland, because in this case the assessment of the equilibrium exchange rate is of vital importance. The prospect of the Polish currency joining the ERM2 provokes controversies and requires research into the economic consequences of accession to the EMU. The international transmission mechanisms affecting the Polish economy are identified within the VEqCM framework. The calculations indicate that in the last years of the analyzed sample (i.e. up to December 2006) the zloty/euro exchange rate was slightly overvalued, and the steady-state level was found to have been adjusting to the value of 4.1 zlotys.     

On the measurable utility theorem

The paper contains an elementary proof of a generalized version of Aumann's Measurable Utility Theorem.     

Existence of equilibria in atomless production economies with price dependent preferences

The existence of a competitive equilibrium for an economy with a measure space of agents is proved by reducing the economy to a three-person game and then applying Debreu's lemma (1952). In addition to the relative simplicity and shortness of the proof, we generalize known results [Aumann (1966), Hildenbrand (1970), Schmeidler (1969)] by allowing both price dependent preferences and satiation.     

Critical essay on the methodology of multiobjective analysis

This paper presents a discussion of methodological issues in multiobjective analysis, encompassing various approaches to multiobjective optimization and decision making. The main thesis is that while there are already many methods for multiobjective analysis, this field would gain from further methodological reflection.