Designing an optimal contest

The paper brings a mechanism design perspective to the study of contests. We consider the problem of selecting a contest success function when the contest designer may also value the prize. We show that any equilibrium outcome that can be achieved by a concave increasing contest success function can be replicated by a linear contest success function. An expected utility maximizing designer should employ a linear homogeneous contest success function. We explicitly derive the optimal contest for a risk-neutral designer and present comparative statics results. Tullock's contest is optimal only when the designer's valuation for the prize is low.     

Tracking the U.S. health sector: the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic

Business Economics - Health spending has grown faster than the U.S. economy for decades and currently represents approximately 18% of gross domestic product. As with other sectors of the economy,...     

Innovation and Price Informativeness

We study whether the innovation decisions of a firm are improved as a result of information reflected in the firm's stock price. We show that firms with more informative stock prices, as measured by price nonsynchronicity, have better innovation outcomes, as measured by the number of patents and patent citations. Our results are not driven by managerial private information and are robust to various alternative specifications. We also find that price informativeness is more important to innovation when managers are less experienced or face greater uncertainty about the optimal innovation strategy, and that these effects are primarily observed in small‐ and mid‐sized firms where additional information may be of greater value. Our results are consistent with the notion that capital markets can have real effects on the economy.     

Updated trends in US brand-name and generic drug competition

Objective: To provide updated evidence on US trends in: market exclusivity periods (MEPs, time between brand-name drug launch and first generic competitors) for new molecular entities (NMEs); likelihood, timing and number of Hatch-Waxman Act Paragraph IV patent challenges; and generic drug penetration.

Methods: This study used IMS Health National Sales Perspectives^TM US data to calculate MEPs for the 288 NMEs experiencing initial generic entry between January 1995 and December 2014, the number of generic competitors for 12 months afterward (by level of annual sales prior to generic entry), and generic penetration rates. The likelihood, timing and number of Paragraph IV challengers were calculated using data from Abbreviated New Drug Approval (ANDA) letters, the FDA website, public information searches, and ParagraphFour.com.

Results: For drugs experiencing initial generic entry in 2013–2014, the MEP was 12.5 years for drugs with sales greater than $250 million (in 2008 dollars) in the year prior to generic entry ($250 million?+?NMEs), 13.6 years overall. After generic entry, brands rapidly lost sales, with their average unit share being 7% at 1 year for $250 million?+?NMEs, 12% overall. Ninety-four percent of $250 million?+?NMEs experiencing initial generic entry in 2013–2014 had faced at least one Paragraph IV challenge, an average of 5.2 years after brand launch (76% and 5.9 years for all NMEs). NMEs faced an average of 5.1 and 6.2 Paragraph IV challenges per NME, for all and $250 million?+?NMEs, respectively.

Limitations: Analyses, including Paragraph IV calculations, were restricted to NMEs where generic entry had occurred.

Conclusion: The average 2013–2014 MEP of 12.5 years for $250 million?+?NMEs, 13.6 overall remains consistent with prior research. MEPs are lower, and Paragraph IV challenges are more frequent and occur earlier for $250 million?+?drugs. Generic share erosion is also greater, and continues to intensify for both NME types.     

A Note on Capital IQ's Credit Line Data

Empirical work in finance is increasingly using Capital IQ's detailed data on capital structure. We compare the Capital IQ credit line data to hand‐collected data for a random sample of firms. Missing values in Capital IQ are prevalent, so the data set underreports the importance of corporate credit lines. When data are reported, Capital IQ often differs from hand‐collected credit line activity. We suggest methods for correcting the errors in the Capital IQ data, note which portions of the data are most reliable, and quantify the effects of Capital IQ's underreporting by examining the tradeoff between cash and lines of credit.     

To What Extent do United Kingdom Companies Provide Oil and Gas Reserves Information Sufficient to Satisfy Statement of Recommended Practice Requirements?

The uncertainty surrounding oil and gas reserves estimation and the cost of gathering reserves data discourage firms from disclosing sufficient data to satisfy SORP (statement of recommended practice) requirements, especially where oil and gas reserves disclosure is discretionary. However, the need to reduce agency cost and signal to stakeholders induces firms to disclose oil and gas reserves. The contrasting views on the rationale guiding the extent of disclosure were examined in this study. A sample was drawn from 83 United Kingdom (UK) oil and gas exploration and production companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. Appropriate statistical tools were used to investigate the extent of oil and gas reserves disclosure. The findings provide mixed results about the extent of disclosure to meet SORP's requirements. There was no particular evidence that UK oil and gas companies provide qualitatively acceptable oil and gas reserves quantity information. The observed varying degrees of disclosure in the market could be attributed to a discretionary regime that allows firms to determine how and when to disclose. Policy makers and industry regulators could find the results useful in assessing the current extent of disclosure compliance.     

基于混合溢出效应的产业共性技术研发组织模式研究

研究了共性技术的R&D竞争、R&D卡特尔、RJV(ResearchJointVenture)竞争3种基本研发组织模式;在考虑投入溢出和成果溢出共存、溢出总量随时间T变化的基础上,引入研发风险率函数,通过对各组织模式的生产者剩余、消费者剩余和R&D投资率进行比较,总结出更适合共性技术研发和扩散的组织模式。结果表明:市场机制下,企业不一定会选择RJV;从社会福利角度,RJV产生的社会剩余大于R&D卡特尔和R&D竞争模式的社会剩余;为使社会福利最大化,政府应引导企业形成RJV。     

Shareholder coordination and corporate innovation

We show that greater shareholder coordination, as proxied by the geographic proximity between institutional investors, is positively related to corporate innovation outcomes. This relationship is driven by coordination among dedicated and independent institutions who have strong monitoring incentives and is more pronounced among firms with lower blockholder ownership and greater information asymmetry where there is greater benefit to monitoring. We propose that shareholder coordination promotes corporate innovation through a reduction in managerial agency problems. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that greater shareholder coordination enables diffuse shareholders to monitor managers more effectively and enhances corporate innovation.     

Spatio-temporal determinants of the structural and productive transformation of regions in Central and East European countries

This paper investigates the determinants of the structural (between-sectoral) and productive (within-sectoral) transformation of 56 NUTS2 regions in Central and East European (CEE) countries over the 2008–2014 period. Over the analysed period, a transformation of the analysed regions has taken place towards the tertiary sector and high value-added activities. The results from a spatial panel Durbin analysis reveal the existence of product-space linkages and point to a productive transformation towards high technology-intensive activities as an important driver of industrial development. Equal access to digital infrastructure in urban and rural areas and transfer of skills, knowledge and resources through the inflow of foreign investment and imports of production inputs increase the contribution of manufacturing to regional employment. The effect of profit tax reductions on the share of manufacturing employment is about five times larger than the effect of government subsidies to production.