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The paper examines the effects of an environmental tax reform in a small open economy with decentralised wage bargaining, monopolistically competitive firms and equilibrium unemployment. There is a tradable and a non-tradable sector and all firms use labour as well as an imported polluting factor of production (energy). A key result is that a tax on energy, recycled to reduce the payroll tax, reduces unemployment if there is a tradable sector wage premium. However, even if energy taxes may boost employment, welfare will not necessarily improve. Numerical simulations suggest that energy taxes in general provide an environmental dividend but also reduce real GDP. 相似文献
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This paper outlines a simple model to examine some long-run implications of short-time work schemes (STWs) on labor market performance and welfare. It is not clear that STWs reduce unemployment as the induced wage push discourages job creation. 相似文献
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Serge-Christophe Kolm 《Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics》2000,71(2):171-189
Good social relations have more or less an aspect of gift-giving which, by nature, can be neither bought nor imposed. Interaction in this respect will lead purely selfish people to an irremediably inferior state, while pure altruism and unconditional morality are very demanding on the ground of motivation. However, a satisfactory solution solely requires that an actor reciprocates the others' attitude, a much less demanding behaviour. Such reciprocity also fosters standard economic efficiency, and can be elicited by a number of widespread psychological features. 相似文献
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Serge-Christophe Kolm 《Journal of Economic Theory》1976,13(1):82-111
This paper analyzes properties of measures of inequality, applied to income inequalities but meaningful for practically any measure of dispersion in economics. We call n the number of persons, i the person's index, xi person i's income, the average income, x the vector of the xi's or income distribution, I(x) a real-valued function of x which is the measure (or index) of inequality.Part I (Sects. I–V), which appeared in the last issue of this journal, analyzed several structures or properties, and specific forms, of I. We distinguished several I's: the measures of inequality per person (or “absolute”) Ia, per pound (or “relative”) , and total nIa. We presented several possible properties of inequality measures, such as: I = 0 if all xi's are equal (“zero at equality”), I > 0 otherwise (“positivity out of equality”), symmetry of I for x (“impartiality”), for xi ≠ xj (“rectifiance” of the function I, or “transfers principle,” this being the strict form whereas the weak one is with sign ?), the fact that does not depend upon xk for k ≠ i,j (“welfare independence,” or, for short, “independence”). Rectifiance plus symmetry is Schur-convexity. Independence plus symmetry plus zero at equality implies that where is the “equal equivalent income”; and we will show that, these three properties being satisfied, the following ones are equivalent to each other: positivity out of equality, rectifiance, quasi-convexity, ?'s concavity.Part I largely focused on the study of six related specific measures of inequality, which in particular possess all the above properties: ?, α, and Ξ being positive parameters, they are , , , Ir=Icr for ξ=O, for ξ=, and . Lower indices c, r, l respectively stand for “centrist,” “rightist,” and “leftist” measures of inequality. Ir and Il are invariant under respectively equiproportional variation in, or equal addition to, all incomes; measures which have the first of these two properties are said to be “intensive.”We now consider different and more general measures, and other properties. We first reconcile the last two properties by dropping the “indepencence” one (Section VI.). Then, we analyze another mildly equalitarian property, the “principle of diminishing transfers” (Section VII). Section VIII turns to the relations between inequality measures and Lorenz and concentration curves. We then consider the effect on inequality of additions of incomes, and we analyze the properties of “diminishing equality” (Section IX). The effect of unions of populations is the topic of Section X. Finally, the last section (XI) presents the more general relations between the various structural properties of inequality measures.1 相似文献
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In-work benefits are becoming an increasingly relevant labour market policy, gradually expanding in scope and geographical
coverage. This paper investigates the equilibrium impact of in-work benefits and contrasts it with the traditional partial
equilibrium analysis. We find under which conditions accounting for equilibrium wage adjustments amplifies the impact of in-work
benefits on search intensity, participation, employment, and unemployment, compared to a framework in which wages are fixed.
We also account for the financing of these benefits and determine the level of benefits necessary to achieve efficiency in
a labour market characterized by search externalities. 相似文献
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Labour Taxation in a Unionised Economy with Home Production 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Ann-Sofie Kolm 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2000,102(4):689-705
The impact of payroll taxes on unemployment and welfare are examined in a model with household production and union–firm wage bargaining. The analysis shows that unemployment typically falls as the payroll tax rate in the market sector for household substitutes (the service sector) is reduced. This holds even when the payroll tax rate in the non-service sector is raised in order to maintain a balanced government budget. Welfare improves with a reduced-service-sector payroll tax rate only if unions are equally strong and firms are equally labour intensive across the sectors.
JEL classification : E 24; H 21; J 22; J 51 相似文献
JEL classification : E 24; H 21; J 22; J 51 相似文献