THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF UPSTREAM MERGERS IN THE PRESENCE OF DOWNSTREAM ENTRY BARRIERS*

We examine the incentives for upstream firms to consolidate horizontally and the impact of this process on industry performance, when there are downstream entry barriers and firms negotiate bilaterally. In the short run, consumers are not worse off with upstream mergers, since consolidation only results in a redistribution of industry rents. In the long run, consumers are better off after upstream mergers, since they induce more entry into that segment. When social welfare is evaluated, a limit on upstream consolidation may prevent excessive entry; but upstream entry can be sometimes insufficient, if the retailers' intrinsic bargaining power is excessive.     

The Size of Strategic Alliances and the Role Played by Managers

Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade - The vast empirical literature on strategic alliances has often overlooked their theoretical foundations. We pose a hypothesis: do small and medium...     

Permit markets, market power, and the trade-off between efficiency and revenue raising

This paper focuses on an emissions permit market dominated by one firm and with a government concerned about social efficiency and permits revenue. In this setting, it is shown that the dominant firm's market power reduces the opportunities for the government to raise non-distortionary revenue from permits without loss of consumer surplus. Since the government's objectives are thus hampered in auctioning permits, the dominant firm should be excluded from the auction. Specifically, the regulator should sell permits directly, through bilateral negotiation, to the dominant firm, and auction off the remaining permits to the fringe firms.     

On contract duration of royalty licensing contracts

This paper explores how the choice of royalties and contract duration can be a device to mitigate opportunistic behavior in the presence of asymmetric information. It presents a model where an upstream patent holder with no production capabilities licenses a product innovation, by means of royalty-only contracts, to several downstream firms that produce and market the new product. In a two-period signaling model, the profitability of short-term and long-term contracts is compared, given that the licensees’ costs may be inferred by observation of their output levels. For a sufficiently large difference in production costs, the patentee introduces a series of short-term contracts, rather than a long-term contract for the entire expected lifetime of the innovation. In such a sequence of contracts, both high- and low-cost firms pay the same royalty rate (which is not higher than that of long-term contracts) and reveal their costs in the first licensing period. Thereafter, royalties are smaller (than in the first period) for high-cost firms but larger for low-cost producers so as to increase expected total output and licensing income. Overall, royalties are not time-decreasing, in expected terms, as information evolves from incomplete to complete. This strategy is typically welfare-improving.     

Screening and signalling for technology licensing: a comparison

This article studies, in an adverse selection set‐up, how a patentee licenses a new technology in a two‐period context where the licensee has private information on its marginal cost of production. Two different ways of licensing are considered: the patentee offers, in the first period, either a menu of contracts that screens the different types of licensee or a single contract that obliges the licensee to signal its true type. Of these two contracts, the better for the patentee depends on the probability of the innovation gives rise to a low marginal cost and the difference between the high and low cost. Findings explain, to some degree, the variety of licensing contracts observed in practice (some including only a fixed fee, and others including both a royalty and a fixed fee). This variety may be rationalised by the use of different devices (signalling or screening) aimed at alleviating the effects of opportunism. A welfare comparison of the two means for extracting hidden information from the licensee is also made.     

Do bad borrowers hurt good borrowers? A model of biased banking competition

Portuguese Economic Journal - This paper explores a two-bank model in which, first, one bank correctly estimates the probability of low-quality loan repayment while the other overestimates it, and...     

Forward contracts and competition

This paper examines the strategic use of forward contracts in an industry where downstream firms must buy an essential input from imperfectly competitive upstream suppliers. When a single large firm and a fringe of firms exist downstream, the large firm buys forward contracts from the fringe, i.e. there is horizontal subcontracting from the large firm to the firms on the fringe, in order to make the spot market less competitive. Hence our paper argues that horizontal subcontracting becomes an anti-competitive device. We also compare the strategies of buying forward contracts and purchasing productive capacity and we find that both are equivalent tools. When the downstream industry has instead several large firms, they have a “horizontal” incentive to sell forward contracts in order to gain market share, but the former “vertical” incentive to buy them persists. In this case, forward contracting may then lead to less competition in the spot market. We are indebted to Ramon Faulí-Oller, José Manuel Ordó?ez and Juan Carlos Reboredo for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. We also gratefully acknowledge the valuable observations made by two anonymous referees and a Co-Editor that led to substantial improvements. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies. Antelo acknowledges financial support from the Xunta de Galicia (Grant PGIDIT02PXIA20101PR) and Bru that from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (Grant PB98-1402).     

Selectivity, Pulse Fishing and Endogenous Lifespan in Beverton-Holt Models

Optimal management in a multi-cohort Beverton-Holt model with any number of age classes and imperfect selectivity is equivalent to finding the optimal fish lifespan by chosen fallow cycles. Optimal policy differs in two main ways from the optimal lifespan rule with perfect selectivity. First, weight gain is valued in terms of the whole population structure. Second, the cost of waiting is the interest rate adjusted for the increase in the pulse length. This point is especially relevant for assessing the role of selectivity. Imperfect selectivity reduces the optimal lifespan and the optimal pulse length. We illustrate our theoretical findings with a numerical example. Results obtained using global numerical methods select the optimal pulse length predicted by the optimal lifespan rule.     

Asymmetric information, signaling and environmental taxes in oligopoly

This paper examines the effects of signaling on environmental taxation in a two-period oligopoly model in which each firm privately knows whether its technology is clean or dirty, while third parties (the rival firms and the regulator) have only a subjective perception about this fact. Consequently, there are both horizontal and vertical asymmetric information, and each firm can strategically manipulate both, the competitor's and the regulator's priors. In this context, we find that each firm wishes to be perceived as a technologically clean firm in period 2 whenever the regulator's ecological conscience is sufficiently high. We also show that taxes under symmetric information are always positive, but under asymmetric information and signaling they may be negative (subsidies) and lower or greater than in the symmetric information case, depending on the ecological conscience of the regulator and the probability of firms being dirty. Finally, taxes are below environmental marginal damage, both under symmetric and asymmetric information, and signaling reinforces such under-taxation.     

The role of short-term contracts and subsidies in licensing

An innovator without production facilities owns a patented invention that lasts two periods, and looks for the best licensing arrangement with a producer that has private information about the market value of the invention. The license is either a single long-term contract in force over both periods or a series of short-term contracts, one per period. Under short-term contracts, the licensee can strategically signal the value of the invention with its level of production in the first period and thus influence the terms of the contract in the second period. We show that the licensor prefers successive short-term contracts rather than a single long-term contract for intermediate-level probabilities of dealing with an efficient licensee, while the first-period contract may optimally include a per-unit subsidy (a negative royalty rate) in order to correct signaling distortions in the licensee’s production for this period. We also show that prohibiting such subsidies can lead to welfare losses.