A noncooperative model of contest network formation

In this paper we study a model of weighted network formation. The bilateral interaction is modeled as a Tullock contest game with the possibility of a draw. We describe stable networks under different concepts of stability. We show that a Nash stable network is either the empty network or the complete network. The complete network is not immune to bilateral deviations. When we allow for limited farsightedness, a stable network immune to bilateral deviations must be a complete $M$-partite network, with partitions of different sizes. We provide several comparative statics results illustrating the importance of the structure of stable networks in mediating the effects of shocks and interventions. In particular, we show that an increase in the likelihood of a draw has a nonmonotonic effect on the level of wasteful contest spending in the society. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to model weighted network formation when the actions of individuals are neither strategic complements nor strategic substitutes.     

The Austrian theory of the cooperative firm

This paper draws on Wicksell's Value, Capital and Rent. The (comparative-statics) response of the cooperative to a change in its parameters (capital stock, rate of interest paid on capital stock, and production function) is examined. Severe employment problems may be expected if, in a cooperative setting, the rate of interest is, by macroeconomic management, kept at a relatively low level. Technological progress also may lead to a contraction in employment and even, under some circumstances, cause a decline in output per man. The cooperative is throughout contrasted with its capitalist counterpart.     

Valuing Mortgage Insurance Contracts in Emerging Market Economies

We develop a new option-based method for the valuation of mortgage insurance contracts in closed form in an economy where agents are risk neutral. While the proposed valuation method is general and can be used in any market, it may be particularly useful in emerging market economies where other existing methods may be either inappropriate or are too difficult to implement because of the lack of relevant data. As an application, we price a typical Serbian government-backed mortgage insurance contract.     

Fiscal Consolidation and Decentralisation: A Tale of Two Tiers*

This paper contributes to the established literature on fiscal consolidations by investigating the distinct behaviour of central and sub‐central tiers of government during general government consolidation attempts. In the light of different degrees of decentralisation across OECD countries, and the different responsibilities devolved to sub‐central tiers, we believe that this approach offers an illuminating insight into the analysis of fiscal consolidations and their success. We show that the involvement of the sub‐central tiers of government is crucial to achieving cuts in expenditure, particularly in relation to the overall size of the government wage bill. In addition, central governments appear to exert a strong influence on the expenditure of sub‐central tiers through their grant allocations, and control of these allocations appears to have a considerable impact upon the overall success of consolidation attempts. Finally, we demonstrate that there is a skewness in cuts towards sub‐central capital expenditure both when central governments cut grant allocations and when sub‐central governments engage in lone consolidation attempts.     

Intensity of R&D competition and the generation of innovations in heterogeneous setting

This paper discusses the role of technological spillovers and technological races in dynamic strategic interactions setup. Two firms invest simultaneously into new products creation and into further development of the quality of these products. Each firm may benefit from the costless technological spillover in case of technological leadership of the other firm. At the same time they cooperate in the joint creation of new products. Three different scenarios emerge: constant technological leadership, the technological leapfrogging and symmetric outcome with or without potential spillovers. R&D is maximal for the first scenario and minimal for the symmetric play under the threat of spillover with endogenous specialization of firms’ activities in cases of constant leadership and leapfrogging. Definition of technological competition intensity as inverse to the technology gap allows to recover inverted-U relationship between those two in a multidimensional context.     

Financial Support from the Family Network and Illegal Immigration

Barriers to immigration of low‐skilled workers from developing countries into the advanced countries prevent many potential migrants from leaving their countries of origin. With very low home‐country wages in relation to the cost of undocumented migration, the opportunity to migrate often hinges on the possibility of obtaining credit from a human smuggling organization or family and friends. This paper examines the conditions under which migration is optimal for an individual who lacks liquid assets, with a focus on alternative options for financing migration costs. One is by accumulating the required amount of savings out of source‐country income, with or without financial support from the family or social network. The other is debt‐bonded migration, which involves borrowing from a smuggling organization and paying off the loan while working in the host country. I find that greater financial support from the family network increases the attractiveness of debt‐bonded relative to self‐financed migration.     

Great Recession and Macroeconomic Theory: A Useless Crisis?

ABSTRACT

The global financial crisis of 2007–08 and the subsequent Great Recession have pushed many economists to acknowledge a fundamental limit in the theoretical models elaborated after the monetarist counter-revolution: these models disregard the financial system. The years following the Great Recession have thus been marked by the development of what can be called the ‘Financial Frictions Approach’, a theoretical approach based on the addition of the financial system to the New Keynesian DSGE model. The results of this line of research are beginning to appear also in macroeconomics textbooks. Significant examples are the publication of the seventh edition of Blanchard’s textbook, and the publication of the third edition of the textbook co-authored by Blanchard, Amighini and Giavazzi. The objective of this work is twofold: (i) to show that the new model presented by Blanchard, Amighini and Giavazzi, which reflects the results of the ‘Financial Frictions Approach’, does not allow to elaborate a coherent explanation of the Great Recession and (ii) to present the pillars of an alternative theoretical model based on the lessons of Keynes, Schumpeter and Minsky.     

Autocatalytic Growth and Development and the South-North Convergence

Abstract:

This article engages with the issue of income convergence between North and South by using the autocatalytic hypothesis of growth and development. Two system models describe positive and negative feedback loops which govern economic flows between North and South. The analysis of endogenous and exogenous negative feedbacks points to the process that would slowly push the world economy towards vanishing growth rates and, eventually, halt its material growth. The present work rejects convergence in per capita GDP between North and South from the theoretical perspective. Such an outcome would stand against one of the fundamental properties of autocatalytic dynamics—centripetality— that has its causal roots in the competitive process and capitalist institutions. In that sense, the autocatalytic hypothesis provides a theoretical explanation for those empirical analyses that dismisses convergence.