Technology roadmapping (TRM) and strategic alignment for an applied research centre: a case study with methodological contributions

Technology roadmapping provides a strategic tool to help companies develop an outside‐in view and challenge their current competitive perspectives. In this paper, the authors describe the roadmapping process, which is aligned, with the research and development (R&D) strategy of an applied research centre. This process is based in an adapted combination of state‐of‐the‐art methodologies, and as a result, the case study shows interesting findings in terms of R&D strategy, technology strategy and roadmapping processes and methodology.     

Competitive environments and protective behavior

The class of two-person competition games is introduced and analyzed. For any game in this class the set of Nash equilibria is convex and all Nash equilibria lead to the same payoff vector. Competition games are compared to other competitive environments such as unilaterally competitive games and rivalry games. Moreover, protective behavior within competitive environments is analyzed. For matrix games it is known that protective strategies profiles exactly correspond to proper equilibria. It is shown that this result can be extended to the class of unilaterally competitive games.     

Regulation in education

This paper analyses inefficiencies in community composition resulting from peer group effects in education. We depart from the existing literature in two essential ways. Firstly, we introduce heterogeneity between communities (one community is more productive than another if its school produces the same educational quality at lower cost), and secondly, we introduce informational asymmetries by assuming that education, in each community, is financed by local public funds and produced by a school which has private information about its cost when it is privatized.     

Spatial Integration in the Spanish Mackerel Market

This article analyses the potential links between regional first‐sale markets for mackerel in Spain using fractional cointegration techniques. The results indicate that this is not an integrated market, and we demonstrate that there are no links, at least in the long term, between any of Spain's five regional markets. This result has significant implications in policy terms, as local, regional and European authorities must take into account the need to apply distinct local policies.     

Second-best tax policy and natural resource management in growing economies

This paper investigates the exploitation of natural resources in a growing economy within a second-best fiscal policy framework. Agents derive utility from two types of consumption goods—one which relies on a natural resource input and one which does not—as well as from leisure and from natural resource amenity values. We connect second best policy to essential components of utility by considering the elasticity of substitution among each of the four utility arguments. The results illustrate potentially important relationships between amenity values and leisure. When amenity values are complementary with leisure, for instance when natural resources are used for recreation, optimal taxes on goods produced with natural resources generally increase over time. On the other hand, optimal taxes on goods produced from natural resources generally decrease over time when leisure and amenity values are substitutes. Under some parameterizations, complex dynamics leading to non-monotonic time paths can emerge.     

Optimal taxation in the Uzawa–Lucas model with externality in human capital

In this paper we study the optimal policy in the Uzawa–Lucas model with externality in human capital when agents value both consumption and leisure. We find that the government pursuing the first best can achieve its goal by a subsidy which depends on foregone earnings while studying and which is financed through a lump sum tax. Anyway, the optimal policy, that should be designed to provide incentives for agents to devote more time to schooling and cut both on leisure and working, is not unique. There exists an infinite number of combinations of consumption, capital income, labor income and lump sum taxes that can decentralize the first best.     

DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN SPAIN: RELATIVE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS

ABSTRACT We estimate the effects of unemployment benefit and family situation on the unemployment duration in Spain. Empirical results indicate that the distinctions between the exits into employment and the exits from the labour force and between men and women are important. Although unemployment benefit reduces significantly the job-finding probabilities, its effects are much larger on exits from the labour force. Many people who decide to go out of the labour force delay their exits until they exhaust their unemployment benefits. Family situation also has strong effects on the duration of unemployment in Spain. Household heads have about twice larger job-finding probability than non-heads, and having a working household head or other working household members improves employment probability. This suggests that family connections in the labour market are important determinants of unemployment duration in Spain.     

Valuation and Management of Fishing Resources Under Price Uncertainty

The traditional expected-net-present-value methods cannot properly capture the management flexibility and strategic value aspects of a fishery, and may understate its value. Instead, this paper develops a Real Options model to conceptualize and evaluate fishery exploitation flexibility. Specifically, general models to value the opportunity to either exploit or invest in a fishery are presented. They suffice to determine not only these values, but also the optimal policy for opening, closing, delaying and setting its harvest rate. The sustainable case in which the harvest rate equals the natural net growth function is also considered. Concerning the exploitation decision, it is found that, as could be expected, the higher the resource price the higher the value of this opportunity in both models (general and sustainable). However, the resource stock affects both models differently. As to the investment opportunity, its value is always lower than the exploitation opportunity because of investment costs. Finally, numerical simulations are run in order to illustrate the nature of the solution. Sensitivity analysis concerning the influence of the tax rate, convenience yield, risk-free interest rate and price volatility on the value of the fishery is also reported. Earlier versions of this paper have benefited from conference participants at the Young Economists Conference 2000 (Oxford University), Tenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (Oregon State University), XXV Simposio de Análisis Económico (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Spain) and Seminar at the Dpt. Fundamentos del Análisis Económico (Universidad del País Vasco, Spain). We especially thank Prof. Ian Bateman and two anonymous referees whose insightful comments have enabled us to eliminate several errors and to improve the presentation. Murillas gratefully acknowledges doctoral fellowship from Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (AP96), and financial support from the Xunta de Galicia (PGIDT01PXI30004PR) and from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Teconología (SEC 2001-3700). The usual disclaimer applies.     

Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand: Costly Public Funds and the Value of Private Information

In this paper, we analyze the optimal regulation policy when the regulated firm has better information concerning the market demand than the regulator. We show that introducing a cost on public funds into the Planner's objective function does not lead to qualitative results similar to those obtained by introducing distributional considerations. In particular we show that under constant marginal cost the full information policy is not implementable and that the optimal regulatory policy results in informational rents. The social value of private information and the firm's informational rents are both increasing functions of the cost of the public funds.