Preliminary Assessment of Changes in Labels Required by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990

This paper describes a study that assesses some changes in nutrition labels resulting from provisions of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA). Type of nutrition label, nutritional value, and presence (absence) of a nutrition “warning” are tested in a between subjects experimental design. Results indicate that additional nutrition information recommended by the NLEA can significantly affect nutrition attitudes, perceptions, and self-reported product purchase likelihood.     

TARIFFS AND IMPORTS MISINVOICING UNDER OLIGOPOLY

Mismatch of trade statistics between developed and developing countries indicate a substantial misinvoicing of trade figures, primarily by developing country traders. This is due to the inflexible exchange rate regimes, severe import restrictions and export subsidies prevailing in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). In this paper, we focus on import underinvoicing due to high tariff barriers in a market where domestic producers compete with importers. Specifically, we examine how tariff levels, market structure and government intervention (in the form of intensity of monitoring and severity of penalties) affect the levels of underinvoicing. We also look at the optimal levels of import tariff and instruments of government intervention in these circumstances.     

FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE TWIN DEFICITS

In a 1989 Contemporary Policy Issues article Miller and Russek published findings of a causal relation between the fiscal deficit and the trade deficit. However, they found no overwhelming support for reverse causation between the twin deficits. The authors of the analysis here gathered annual data on U.S. federal budget deficits and net exports for 1950–1988 and deflated the nominal values by the GDP deflators to examine the causal relation based on real values. They made a distinction between structural and actual budget deficits. Instead of an arbitrary choice of lag structure, they used Hsiao (1979, 1981) minimum final prediction error criterion to determine the optimum lag lengths of the explanatory variables. The analysis reveals a unidirectional causal relation running from structural budget deficits to net exports, confirming some of Miller and Russek's findings. Contrary to Miller and Russek's conclusions, however, findings here indicate a bi-directional causal relation between actual budget deficits and net exports. These findings suggest important policy implications.     

Ambiguity and Exaggeration in Price Promotion: Perceptions of the Elder and Nonelder Consumer

This paper examines the effects of plausible as well as implausible or exaggerated tensile discounts on consumer discounting behavior, price perceptions, and behavioral intentions. The effects are compared across two consumer segments, elder and nonelder, for a product and a service. Findings indicate that age of the consumer had a significant interaction with discount level for consumer discounting behavior regarding the product offer. While consumers were skeptical of implausible discounts, the effects of implausible and high-plausible discounts on price perceptions were higher than that of low-plausible discounts. In addition, there were no significant differences between the implausible and high-plausible discount levels for price perceptions or behavioral intentions. The results provide implications for public policy makers.     

FISCAL FEDERALISM, STATE LOBBYING AND DISCRETIONARY FINANCE: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA

In the quasi-federal democratic polity that India has, lobbying for central funds by the states is often done in a subliminal fashion. Hence, it becomes difficult to get an account of how much lobbying has been done to a particular end. Our paper attempts at constructing certain political proxy variables to quantify the extent of such lobbying in India. We quantify lobbying through the ministerial representation in the council of ministers. We also use several time and state dummies to account for the constituent states' political alignment with the center as well as the coalition and the reform period breaks in the Indian system. Taking panel data that cover 29 years and 14 major states we show that our constructed variables do explain disparity in central fiscal disbursements under the non-formulaic "discretionary" head in a robust way. Our findings remain true even after we take into account the impact of endogeneity of net state income on the transfers. Additionally, our exercise brings to the fore the fact that the coalition governments and economic reform measures impact upon state lobbying at the center in a significant manner.