Monitoring and collusion with 'soft' information

In the standard principal-supervisor-agent model with collusion,Tirole (1986) shows that employing a supervisor is profitablefor the principal if the supervisor's signal of the agent'scost of production is 'hard' (i.e., verifiable but hideable).Anecdotal evidence suggests that information is sometimes 'soft'(i.e., unverifiable). We show that, in fact, it is profitableto employ a supervisor when information is 'soft' even thoughthe three parties can collude. Therefore, standard applicationsof the principal-supervisor-agent model to regulation and auditinghave more scope than previously thought.     

Arms Races and Negotiations

Two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game. Each player's type determines his propensity to arm. Types are private information, and are independently drawn from a continuous distribution. With probability close to one, the best outcome for each player is for neither to acquire new weapons (although each prefers to acquire new weapons if he thinks the opponent will). There is a small probability that a player is a dominant strategy type who always prefers to acquire new weapons. We find conditions under which the unique Bayesian–Nash equilibrium involves an arms race with probability one. However, if the probability that a player is a dominant strategy type is sufficiently small, then there is an equilibrium of the cheap-talk extension of the game where the probability of an arms race is close to zero.     

The Emergence and Persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German Financial Systems

We use a moral hazard model to compare monitored (nontraded)bank loans and traded (nonmonitored) bonds as sources of externalfunds for industry. We contrast the theoretical conditions thatfavor each system with the historical conditions prevailingwhen these financial systems evolved during the British andGerman industrial revolutions. To study persistence, we consideran entry model where financiers take the industrial structureas given when they lend and firms take the financial systemas given when they borrow. We show multiple equilibria can exist,compare equilibria in welfare terms, and discuss their robustnessto coordination between lenders and borrowers.     

The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors,hierarchies and implementation

Abstract. It is well-known that, when agents in an organization possess private information that is unverifiable by an outside party, games where agents simply announce their information can have multiple equilibria that may impede the successful implementation of the organization's objectives. We show that the introduction of a professional monitor (e.g. auditor, regulator, supervisor) can help to destroy the “bad' equilibria when agents have private information but have incomplete info rmation about others' information. Received: 21 May 1998 / Accepted: 26 May 2000     

Chapter 11: Strategic advantage and social anathema?

The United States is at a crossroad in its treatment of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which deals with reorganization of bankrupt organizations. It is vital that the issues surrounding the debate be properly framed. This paper attempts to do just that by reviewing the evolution of bankruptcy law, assessing the impact of Chapter 11 leniency on societal stakeholders, considering bankruptcy as a strategic option, and addressing the ethical and societal issues that arise from the use of Chapter 11 to avoid massive litigation or to abrogate labor contracts. Serious threats to the underlying fibers of the American system of enterprise are exposed and an assessment of these threats is offered.Brad Johnson is a consultant with FLR Health Resources, Dallas, Texas. His recent research has addressed health care strategic management, societal consequences of health care systems changes, and competitiveness of NFP organizations. B. R. Baliga is Assistant Professor in Business Policy and International Business at the College of Business Administration at Texas Tech University. He has written two books on Strategies of Multinational Corporations and several articles, which have appeared in Strategic Management Journaland Journal of International Business Studies. John D. Blair is Associate Professor of Management at the College of Business Administration at Texas Tech University. He is also Associate Professor of Health Organization and Management at the School of Medicine at Texas Tech University. He has written two coauthored books: The All-Volunteer Force: A Study of Ideology in the Military(University of Michican Press, 1977) and Leadership on the Future Battlefield(Pergamon Press, 1984).     

Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments

We consider repeated games with side-payments: players have an endowment of wealth in each period in which transfers can be made. We show that if endowments are large enough and the common discount factor high enough, then a strongly renegotiation–proof equilibrium (SRP) in the sense of Farrell and Maskin exists. As the discount factor goes to 1, the set of SRP payoffs converges to the set of efficient, individually rational payoffs. These results provide a justification for the efficiency principle when agreements are not enforceable. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, D23, L14.     

Market forces meet behavioral biases: cost misallocation and irrational pricing

Psychological and experimental evidence, as well as a wealth of anecdotal examples, suggests that firms may confound fixed, sunk, and variable costs, leading to distorted pricing decisions. This article investigates the extent to which market forces and learning eventually eliminate these distortions. We envision firms that experiment with cost methodologies that are consistent with real‐world accounting practices, including ones that confuse the relevance of variable, fixed, and sunk costs to pricing decisions. Firms follow “naive” adaptive learning to adjust prices and reinforcement learning to modify their costing methodologies. Costing and pricing practices that increase profits are reinforced. In some market structures, but not in others, this process of reinforcement causes pricing practices of all firms to systematically depart from standard equilibrium predictions.     

Control systems and strategic adaptation: Lessons from the Japanese experience

A model of cultural control is developed and contrasted with the more familiar bureaucratic control model. This model is used to explain processes of strategic adaptation as observed in Japanese cultural control and American bureaucratic control firms. A discussion of the strategic costs and benefits to the organization associated with each type of control is then presented.     

Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: The Use of Multi-Stage Games

This paper shows that, in economic environments with incomplete information, incentive compatibility and a preference reversal condition are sufficient for implementation in sequential equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D71, D82.