RISKY PRODUCTION WITH EX-ANTE PRICES UNDER MONOPOLY ANALYTICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS

This paper concerns the case of a monopolist facing multiplicative uncertainty in demand. Karlin and Carr (1962), henceforth KC, show that, when price and production are both chosen ex ante , the uncertainty price exceeds the certainty price. They also give a sufficient condition under which the firm locates above the certainty demand curve, but they do not consider the effect on the output level. In this note we replicate the KC results and then go further. In the special case that the price elasticity of certainty demand is constant, and the probability distribution for the uncertainty parameter in the demand function is uniform, output is unambiguously lower under uncertainty, and KC's condition for the firm to locate above the certainty demand curve can be strengthened to one that is both necessary and sufficient. The robustness of these results is tested under less stringent assumptions on demand, abandoning symmetry for a lognormal distribution of the uncertainty parameter. Simulation confirms that the results hold up, and also determines the effects upon the firm's decisions of an increase in demand uncertainty.     

NEW ESTIMATES OF TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN INDONESIAN MANUFACTURING

This paper estimates new elasticities of value added with respect to labour and capital in Indonesian manufacturing, controlling for the simultaneity problem that potentially exists between the choice of input levels and a productivity shock (such as an increase in productivity due to new production processes), for plant exit, and for quasi-constant unobservable plant characteristics. It does so by applying the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) production function estimator to plant-level value added, fixed assets, labour, and electricity consumption data over the period 1988–95. This methodology allows us to revisit the previously used growth accounting based elasticities, and thereby improves total factor productivity (TFP) estimates. The results show that, in the period under study, aggregate TFP growth in Indonesian manufacturing was higher than had previously been estimated.     

Micro-entrepreneurship in a hostile environment: evidence from Indonesia

The contribution of micro-entrepreneurship to development has featured prominently in recent economic and policy debates. Using panel data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey over a long period (1993–2007) marked by an important economic crisis in 1997, this paper investigates the impact of financial, human and social capital on households’ participation in micro-entrepreneurship, while accounting for corruption as well as institutional and infrastructure quality. Larger urban households that have greater financial and social capital, and/or whose members have an elementary or secondary education, are more likely to participate. Corruption at the local parliament and local government levels reduces the number of participants, while higher-quality formal institutions and infrastructure boost entrepreneurship. The period is marked by a rise in participation in 2000, but communities that experienced a loss in well-being due to the crisis were less likely to participate in micro-entrepreneurship.     

ENTRANTS' REPUTATION AND INDUSTRY DYNAMICS

This article analyzes entry–exit decisions in a market where reputation determines the price that firms may charge, within a rational‐expectation model of competition in a nonatomic market under heterogeneous reputations. The analysis focuses on the class of name‐switching reputational equilibria, in which a firm discards its name if and only if its reputation falls below the entrants' reputation. The main technical result is the existence of a unique steady‐state equilibrium within this class, in which the entrants' reputation is endogenous. The resulting industry dynamics is largely on agreement with the findings in the empirical literature.     

Women in Business in Late Nineteenth-Century Chile: Class,Marital Status,and Economic Autonomy

This article analyzes Chilean women’s entrepreneurial activity in the 1877–1908 period examining two official data sources representing different socioeconomic business niches – the national trademark registry, which represents the elite among business people, and the Santiago business license registry, which includes the non-elite. The analysis reveals an economy with women engaging increasingly in business in an expanding range of sectors. By the 1890s, women managed nearly a quarter of Santiago’s firms and 5 percent of elite firms nationally. Widows appeared overrepresented among elite businesses and underrepresented among those of the non-elite. These results suggest that institutions constraining entrepreneurship among married women were more strongly enforced among the elite than among other social classes. The evidence thus suggests that during late nineteenth century there was an increase in the economic autonomy exercised by unmarried women and widows of all socioeconomic strata, but also by married women among the non-elite.     

THE DESIGN OF DIRECT DEMAND SUBSIDY PROGRAMS FOR HOUSING IN LATIN AMERICA

Traditional Latin American housing programs, which have used below-market interest rates to convey subsidies, have suffered from serious vices: high per-unit cost and subsidies, low population coverage, lack of transparency, benefits to the middle-class rather than the poor, and inefficiency. Chile broke out of this flawed traditional mode by launching a housing program that conveys subsidies directly to households in die form of a one-time, non-reimbursable grant This approach has spread to other Latin American countries, increasingly with the support of donors. The paper describes and then analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of direct subsidy programs in Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Uruguay to distill ten design lessons: target to low-income households and ensure political autonomy; replace below-market interest rates with direct demand subsidies; use group mechanisms for low-income households; stimulate supply, not just demand; adjust key amounts for inflation; balance progressivity and financial feasibility; join die efforts of various levels of government; use NGOs; establish mechanisms for on-going consolidation of housing solutions; and include measures to promote broader housing sector reform. The conclusion applies these lessons to the design of a housing pilot project in Venezuela.