Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets

This paper considers price discrimination when competing firms do not observe a customer’s type but only some other variable correlated to it. This is a typical situation in many insurance markets—such as motor insurance—where it is also often the case that insurance is compulsory. We characterise the equilibria and their welfare properties under various price regimes. We show that discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as gender is a dominant strategy, either when firms offer policies at a fixed price or when they charge according to some consumption variable that is correlated to costs. In the latter case, gender discrimination can be an outcome of strategic interaction alone in situations where it would not be adopted by a monopolist. Strategic price discrimination may also increase cross subsidies between types, contrary to expectations.JEL Classification No.: L13, G22     

Does player specialization predict player actions? Evidence from penalty kicks at FIFA World Cup and UEFA Euro Cup

Penalty kicks are analysed in the literature as ‘real life experiments’ for assessing the use of rational mixed strategies by professional players. However, each penalty kick cannot be considered a repetition of the same event because of the varying background conditions, in particular the heterogeneous ability of different players. Consequently, aggregate statistics over data sets composed of a large number of penalty kicks mediate the behaviour of the players in different games, and the properties of optimal mixed strategies cannot be tested directly because of aggregation bias. In this article, we model the heterogeneous ability of players. We then test the hypothesis that differently talented players randomize over different actions. To achieve this aim, we study a data set that collects penalties kicked during shoot-out series in the last editions of FIFA World Cup and UEFA Euro Cup (1994–2012) where kickers are categorized as specialists and non-specialists. The results support our theoretical predictions.     

Firm Size Distribution in Small Samples

Sutton (1998) has recently proposed a theoretical lower bound to firm size inequality when a market is made of several independent submarkets. His results are valid asymptotically, as the number of submarkets becomes arbitrarily large. We show that, in small samples, his results can be interpreted as a positive relationship between an index of firm size inequality and the number of submarkets. We also test this relationship in the Italian motor insurance market.     

The investment strategies of publicly sponsored venture capital funds

This paper investigates the effects of public ownership on the investment strategy of hybrid VC funds. We exploit a unique dataset containing data for all of the venture capital funds in Europe that received financial support from the European Investment Fund (EIF) during the years 1998–2007. The dataset includes 179 VC funds that invested in 2482 companies. We find that the level of public ownership shows a weak negative correlation with the likelihood of observing a write-off and that a higher public share is associated with a longer duration for the investment. The latter effect is more relevant for those investments that generate intermediate financial returns. The results are robust to the introduction of controls at the target firm level and for financial market conditions.     

Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Outcome: Open Leagues, Closed Leagues and Competitive Balance *#We thank the Editor and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.

This paper compares conventional static measures of competitive balance with measures that take account of the mobility of teams into the upper ranks of professional leagues, which we call dynamic competitive balance. We use this measure to compare the open soccer leagues that permit entry by the process of promotion and relegation, to the closed leagues of North America where there is no automatic right of entry. We also identify the theoretical distribution of entrants to the top k ranks assuming that all teams have equal probabilities of winning. We find that the open leagues (OL) we study are less balanced, dynamically, than closed leagues (CL), and also that OL lie much further away from the theoretical distribution than CL.