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In general, synergies across license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a simple (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licenses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty increases with increases in fitting complexity. In some environments, bidding may become mutually destructive. Experiments indicate that a properly designed combinatorial auction is superior to a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a threshold problem are not borne out when bidders for small packages can communicate. 相似文献
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Jonathan B. Baker Mark Bykowsky Patrick DeGraba Paul LaFontaine Eric Ralph William Sharkey 《Review of Industrial Organization》2011,39(4):297-309
The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission focused on protecting competition in developing online
markets. Our review discusses important economic issues that are raised by the FCC’s Open Internet rulemaking (which is commonly
referred to as “net neutrality”) and its review of Comcast’s programming joint venture with General Electric’s NBC Universal
affiliate. The Open Internet rule focused on established online markets, while the Comcast/NBCU transaction addressed nascent
competition online along with competition in video programming and distribution offline. 相似文献
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Bykowsky Mark Levy Jonathan Sharkey William Waldon Tracy Wilkie Simon 《Review of Industrial Organization》2003,23(2):157-174
This article reviews some of the major economic issues faced by the FCC in thelast year. It focuses on the application of new analytic techniques at the FCC, andidentifies several areas in which further academic research would be valuable to theFCC.Currently serving as FCC Chief Economist 相似文献
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