排序方式: 共有6条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
Fiscal Policy to Stabilise the Domestic Economy in the EMU: What Can We Learn from Monetary Policy? 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
An important issue for the EMU countries is to what extent fiscalpolicy can be used to stabilise the domestic economy in thecase of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. The paper reviews possiblereforms of national fiscal policy institutions in order to promoteefficient fiscal stabilisation policy: (i) the introductionof a more transparent legal framework for the government's stabilisationdecisions; (ii) the establishment of an independent advisoryFiscal Policy Council; and (iii) the delegation of actual stabilisationdecisions to an independent Fiscal Policy Committee. The conclusionis that the Fiscal Policy Committee solution has much to speakfor itself. It seems possible to delegate fiscal stabilisationpolicy decisions, in much the same way as monetary policy hasbeen delegated to central banks, at the same time as fiscalpolicy decisions focusing on income distribution and socialefficiency are kept in the political sphere. Such delegationcan be made compatible with democratic accountability. (JELE61, E63, P16) 相似文献
2.
Macroeconomic policy, wage setting, and employment - what difference does the EMU make? 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
The likely impact of the EMU on the variability and level ofemployment is analysed. The major conclusions are as follows.(i) Although an inflation-target regime will constrain monetarypolicy of a non-participant in the EMU, it still leaves considerablescope for exchange-rate changes in the case of country-specificdemand shocks, provided that there is some nominal price andwage flexibility. (ii) Variations in payroll taxes can be usedas a substitute for exchange-rate changes in the EMU, but itwill be an imperfect substitute. (iii) Money-wage flexibilityis likely to be larger inside than outside the EMU, but probablynot by much. (iv) There are various mechanisms through whichthe EMU may affect the incentives for labour-market reform toreduce equilibrium unemployment, but the net impact is highlyuncertain. 相似文献
3.
Pattern bargaining with the tradables (manufacturing) sector as the wage leader is common in Europe. We question the conventional wisdom that such bargaining produces wage restraint. In our model, all forms of pattern bargaining give the same outcomes as uncoordinated bargaining under inflation targeting. Under a monetary union, wage leadership for the non‐tradables sector is conducive to wage restraint, whereas wage leadership for the tradables sector is not. Comparison thinking might lead the follower to set the same wage as the leader. Such equilibria can arise when the leader sector is the smaller sector, and these can promote high employment. 相似文献
4.
Lars Calmfors 《Empirica》2001,28(4):325-351
The paper distinguishes between the impact of the EMU on nominal wage flexibility and on equilibrium real wage and unemployment levels. A perceived need to increase nominal wage flexibility as a substitute for domestic monetary policy and a tendency to less real wage moderation in the EMU are likely to promote informal bargaining coordination and social pacts in the medium run. But such coordination is not likely to be sustainable in the long run, as it conflicts with other forces working in the direction of decentralization and deunionization. This could lead to more government intervention in wage setting during a transitional period. Although monetary unification will strengthen the incentives for higher-level transnational coordination of wage bargaining, such a development is improbable in view of the coordination costs involved. If transnational coordination develops, it is most likely to occur within multinational firms. 相似文献
5.
In a bargaining model, we show that a decrease in the unemployment benefit level increases not only equilibrium employment, but also nominal wage flexibility, and thus reduces employment variations in the case of nominal shocks. Long‐term wage contracts lead to higher expected real wages and hence higher expected unemployment than short‐term contracts. Therefore, a decrease in the benefit level reduces the expected utility gross of contract costs of a union member more with long‐term than with short‐term contracts, thereby creating an incentive for shorter contracts. Incentives for employers are shown to change in the same direction. 相似文献
6.
1