An empirical note about estimation and forecasting Latin American Forex returns volatility: the role of long memory and random level shifts components

Portuguese Economic Journal - A set of RLS-type models with ARMA and ARFIMA dynamics is estimated and compared in a forecasting exercise with ARFIMA, GARCH and FIGARCH models. It is an extension of...     

The education pillar of the Europe 2020 strategy: a convergence analysis

Empirica - In March 2010, the European Commission launched the Europe 2020 strategy ‘for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ in the EU. Education is a major pillar of the Europe...     

Coordination in a skeptical two-group population

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination - This paper explores a situation in which a population split into two groups attempts to achieve the socially efficient outcome of a coordination...     

Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution with Probabilistic Preferences and Multiple Decision Makers

Group Decision and Negotiation - In this paper, matrix methods are developed to determine stable states in the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) with probabilistic preferences with n...     

Determinants of total efficiency in water utilities in Mexico

By using panel data analysis across 368 water utilities in Mexico over the period 2010–2014, we find that small firms are more efficient than medium and large providers and that increasing production is associated with less efficiency. Billing, income collection and profitability are relevant factors to improve efficiency. Medium and large firms require to measure consumption by service with meters in order to increase efficiency, while small firms do not require it.     

Estimation of the mean in ranked set sampling with non responses

The estimation of the population mean when ranked set sampling [rss] is used for selecting the sample and non responses [nr] are present, is studied. The nr stratum is sub sampled using simple random sampling with replacement. Two strategies are analyzed. One of them is based on the selection of a sub sample from the nr in each cycle. The other uses sub samples selected among the nr in each rank.  The accuracy of the proposed estimators is characterized by the corresponding expected variances. Simulations and real life data are used for analyzing the behavior of them. Acknowledgements: This paper was developed partially during the visit of the author to Université des Antilles et Gouyane. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful suggestions of the referees and thanks the support of DAAD for visiting Humboldt University where a version of the paper version was made.     

Worker Turnover, Job Turnover and Collective Bargaining in Spain

This paper analyses the relationship between the presence of organized labour in firms (approximated by the scope of collective bargaining) and the extent of gross worker and job flows. According to the voice theory of Freeman, those firms having a union presence will have lower worker mobility. However, there is no analysis of the effects of the presence of organized labour on gross job flows. Using a Spanish data base, we find evidence of the existence of a voice effect on gross worker flows but not clear support for a voice effect on gross job flows.     

Mixed Duopoly,Merger and Multiproduct Firms

The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm.     

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.