Limit-pricing as Bertrand equilibrium

Summary. We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with increasing returns to scale where one of the firms have a cost advantage and prices vary over a grid. We find that typically more than one equilibria exist. However, there are only two perfect equilibria. Moreover, as the size of the grid becomes small, both these equilibria converge to the limit-pricing outcome. Received: February 25, 2000; revised version: January 9, 2001     

Institutional Ownership, Strategic Choices and Corporate Efficiency: Evidence from Japan

Based on the tenets of capital allocation systems theory, stewardship theory, and 'going concern' concept of business, institutional ownership is proposed to affect corporate productivity, both directly and indirectly, in large Japanese corporations through a set of four firm-level choices: product/market development, R&D intensity, capital intensity, and leverage. Using data on 118 corporations drawn from five industry sectors in Japan, and applying a partial mediation technique, this study tests an integrated, causal model of the relationships among these variables. Results show mixed support for the model. No direct relationship between institutional ownership and productivity is observed. However, institutional ownership affects productivity indirectly through R&D intensity and leverage. Although product/market development and capital intensity also affect productivity, institutional ownership has no significant relationship with them.     

Joint-Liability in Microcredit: Evidence from Bangladesh

The joint-liability lending model in microcredit predicts social ties between groups of borrowers to incentivise repayment. However, it also promotes free riding behaviour. Repeated experimental games conducted in Bangladesh are used to empirically analyse key theoretical hypotheses predicted under joint-liability (repeated experimental games are conducted by the author on the field in Manikganj, Dhaka, Bangladesh in December 2014); treated groups of microcredit borrowers are compared to control groups of non-microcredit borrowers alongside questionnaire findings. Treated individuals forego short-run gains from non-repayment and benefit from higher long-run gains from progressing on to further rounds. The paper also finds that treated individuals are significantly less likely to free ride and more likely to shoulder for their partner compared to control individuals. Optimal individual and group characteristics to maximise repayment under joint-liability are then identified.     

The All‐Pay Auction with Nonmonotonic Payoff

I model innovation contests as an all‐pay auction in which it is possible not to achieve successful innovation despite costly R&D investments, and as a result, there is no winner. In such a case, the winning payoff turns out to be nonmonotonic in own bid. I derive the sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, and fully characterize the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibrium. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the support of the low‐value bidder is not continuous, and both the high‐value and the low‐value bidders place an atom in the (distinct) lower bound of their respective support. Under symmetric valuation, both bidders place an atom at zero. These results can explain why one does not observe very low quality innovation in real life, or why even symmetric firms may stay out of an innovation contest.     

FDI and Growth: What Causes What?

This paper examines the causal relationship between FDI and economic growth by using an innovative econometric methodology to study the direction of causality between the two variables. We apply our methodology, based on the Toda‐Yamamoto test for causality, to time‐series data covering the period 1969–2000 for three developing countries, namely Chile, Malaysia and Thailand, all of them major recipients of FDI with a different history of macroeconomic episodes, policy regimes and growth patterns. Our empirical findings clearly suggest that it is GDP that causes FDI in the case of Chile and not vice versa, while for both Malaysia and Thailand, there is a strong evidence of a bi‐directional causality between the two variables. The robustness of the above findings is confirmed by the use of a bootstrap test employed to test the validity of our results.     

Matching a cause with self‐schema: The moderating effect on brand preferences

The moderating roles of consumer brand involvement type and product type on the effect of a match between consumers' self‐schema and the cause a brand supports on consumers' preference for the cause‐supporting brand is investigated. The authors show that a schema–cause match enhances consumer preference for a brand engaging in cause‐related marketing when (1) consumers' involvement with the brand is of the impression‐relevant type (vs. outcome‐relevant type) and (2) when the branded product is functional (vs. hedonic). © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Inequality and Size of the Informal Sector during Recession: A Note

This note provides a theoretical explanation for the empirical observation that more unequal economies tend to have larger informal sector. In contrary to the general belief, it shows that informal sector does not necessarily expand at the time of recession acting as a buffer for the unemployed pool.     

Book reviews

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Quantitative aspects of economic and financial reform in the GDR

Quantitative aspects of economic and financial reform in the GDR