Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count

Summary. We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrows independence of irrelevant alternatives condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (Condorcet cycles). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains.Received: 24 November 2003, Revised: 12 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D71. Correspondence to: Clemens PuppeThe third author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), Graduiertenkolleg 629 at the University of Bonn and from the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA F 043496).     

Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms

This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied.     

Location matters: Estimating cluster premiums for prominent modern artists

This paper shows that ‘location matters’ in terms of premiums on creative clusters and peak ages. The analysis is based on the 214 most prominent modern visual artists born 1850-1945 and the art clusters of Paris and New York. Auction records of the past 20 years are used to estimate the value of artworks over an artist's career. The overall cluster premium for paintings produced in Paris and New York is found to be 11% and 43%, respectively; paintings made in Paris during the First World War have a premium of 14% while those produced between 1946 and 1975 have a premium of 27%. New York offers premiums for paintings produced there for all periods after the First World War, peaking at 74% between 1946 and 1975. When decomposing this premium, we find that quality rather than quantity of artists in the location is driving the results. It is argued that artists working in a cluster location reach a peak in the age-price profile of their work significantly earlier than artists working elsewhere.     

With which countries do tax havens share information?

In recent years tax havens and offshore financial centres have come under increasing political pressure to cooperate with other countries in matters of taxation and efforts to crowd back tax evasion and avoidance. As a result many tax havens have signed tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs). In order to comply with OECD standards tax havens are obliged to sign at least 12 TIEAs with other countries. This paper investigates how tax havens have chosen their partner countries. We ask whether they have signed TIEAs with countries to which they have strong economic links or whether they have systematically avoided doing this, so that information exchange remains ineffective. We analyse 565 TIEAs signed by tax havens in the years 2008–2011 and find that on average tax havens have signed more TIEAs with countries to which they have stronger economic links. Our analysis thus suggests that tax havens do not systematically undermine tax information exchange by signing TIEAs with irrelevant countries. However, this does not mean that they exchange information with all important partner countries.     

Der EU Richtlinienvorschlag für erneuerbare Energien — Eine Analyse der Transferrestriktionen von Herkunftsnachweisen

Until now the promotion of renewable energies in Europe has been effected on the basis of different promotion systems of the Member States. Currently the EU-wide harmonisation of the promotion systems, from which yields of efficiency and a higher effectiveness are expected, cannot be enforced due to a discordance concerning the “right” promotion instrument.With the proposal for a directive on the promotion of renewable energies, published at the 23. January in 2008, the European Commission attempts to make a first move towards harmonisation. Besides existing promotion systems it will be possible to transfer Guarantees of Origin for renewable energies between Member States. Since, however, some Member States expect negative effects as a consequence of opening their markets the proposal comprises opportunities to restrict the transfer. The present scope of interpretation within the proposal allows for different options concerning the design of the transfer restrictions. These will be identified, analysed, and subsequently evaluated in this article. Despite of both extreme options, the possibility to entirely opt out of the transfer system and the obligation to completely participate in the transfer system, two further hybrid options are discussed. The latter are characterised by the possibility of Member States to restrict the transfer of Guarantees of Origin to a certain extent through a “system of prior authorisation”.