Macroeconomic consequences of state fragility in sub‐Saharan Africa

Are poor macroeconomic outcomes primarily the result of economic policies, or of deeper underlying state fragility problems in sub‐Saharan Africa? We attempt to answer this question by using carefully specified dynamic panel regression techniques to show how state fragility conditions help to explain the differences in the macroeconomic performance of sub‐Saharan African economies, and to identify the most plausible mechanisms of transmission. We find that countries with greater fragility suffer higher macroeconomic volatility and crisis; they also experience weaker growth. When we disaggregate state fragility into its various components, we find that it is the security and social components that have the strongest causal impact on macroeconomic outcomes, while the political component is, at best, weak. Therefore, we conclude that it is state fragility conditions, and not necessarily macroeconomic policies, that are of first‐order importance in explaining the differences in macroeconomic performance for African countries. The knock‐on effects are mostly mediated through the fiscal channel, the aid channel, and the finance channel. Accordingly, we recommend that interventions in fragile states should best focus on exploiting the potential for using fiscal policy, aid, and finance as instruments to improve macroeconomic outcomes in sub‐Saharan Africa.     

Consumption risk-sharing under terror shocks: Evidence from value-chain network rosters in Nigeria

Households in Nigeria live in inherently risky environments; accentuated by the preponderance of terror incidences, banditry, and farmer–herder-related clashes that are more concentrated in the northern than southern parts of the country. This study examines the proposition that households with a robust network roster—especially networks related to ethnicities and financial remittances from outside their communities—are better able to weather the idiosyncratic and aggregate impact of terror-related shocks; and thus, experience less consumption variability to terror-related shock than other similar households without the “insurance” of an external network. Our main empirical strategy applies a panel difference-in-differences specification to three waves of the LSMS-ISA surveys for Nigeria. The results from the study indicate that having external networks outside the community is an important coping mechanism for terror-related shocks, both for overall welfare and food consumption. The difference in consumption variability between groups with outside network “insurance” and those without could be as high as 20 percentage points. Thus, risk-sharing arrangements for households should exploit outside network insurance mechanisms to mitigate welfare losses from terror-related shocks.