WHAT DETERMINANTS AFFECT THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF CONSUMER CO‐OPERATIVES? THE CASE OF iCOOP KOREA

The capital structure of co‐operatives can differ from that of IOB (Investor‐Owned Businesses) since the two organizations differ in their aims, governance structures and decision‐making principles. This paper examines whether the determinants verified in IOB affect the leverage ratio of consumer co‐operatives. Consumer co‐operatives in South Korea have been rapidly growing during the last decade. There are two leading theories in finance that explain capital structure: the trade‐off and pecking order theories. Focusing on consumer co‐operatives in South Korea, the paper aims to analyze empirically what determinants have effect on the capital structure of consumer co‐operatives and which of the two theories is more plausible. This study reveals that profitability and firm size have a significantly negative effect on leverage while tangibility and growth have a significantly positive effect on it. In conclusion, it seems that neither of the theories above perfectly accounts for the capital structure of consumer co‐operatives because of the differences in governance characteristics between consumer co‐operatives and IOB as well as in the costs of bankruptcy, agency, informational asymmetry and securities issuance.     

组织公正对餐饮业员工工作态度和行为的影响研究

文章以组织行为学为理论基础,运用结构方程模型研究了组织公正对餐饮业员工工作态度和行为的影响。研究结果显示：（1）分配公正和程序公正都对工作满意和组织承诺有显著的正向影响,但程序公正的影响较大;（2）程序公正对分配公正有显著的正向影响;（3）工作满意和组织承诺正向相关,并且都对员工的离职意向和顾客导向有显著的影响;（4）就影响方向来说,工作满意和组织承诺负向影响员工的离职意向,正向影响员工的顾客导向。文章最后提出了管理建议、研究的不足之处和进一步研究的方向。     

MACROECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN AFRICAN AGRICULTURE

This article employs a two‐stage procedure to investigate the impact of macroeconomic policy reforms on the agricultural productivity growth of 33 African countries from 1981 to 2001. In the first stage, we measure agricultural productivity using a nonparametric Malmquist productivity index. In the second stage, we build a generalized method of moments (GMM) model with a measure of structural adjustment program (SAP) intensity as a key instrument for macroeconomic policy reforms. We also control for the effects of globalization, civil violence, level of development of physical and financial infrastructure, and other economic variables as well as natural resource factors that directly affect agricultural productivity. Our results indicate a strong positive correlation between the extent of SAP intensity and agricultural productivity, suggesting that the macroeconomic policy reforms improved agricultural productivity growth in the sample countries. (JEL E6, O13, O41)     

THE CLUSTERING OF IPO SPREADS IN KOREAN IPO MARKET: COMPETITION OR COLLUSION?

This paper examines whether the clustering of initial public offering (IPO) spreads in the IPO market occurs through competition or collusion, using the period from January 2000 to July 2006 as the analytical range. It finds that the Korean IPO market spread is clustered at 3.5% on moderately sized IPOs (i.e., IPOs between 9 (KRW billion) and 33 (KRW billion)), representing a 74% overall rate that increases gradually over time. Our empirical results refute the collusion theory. The Korean IPO market is characterised by low concentration. A 3.5% spread does not represent abnormal profits relative to other IPOs. Cost saving (i.e. an inverse U shape) is confirmed by the use of 3.5% offers. Our results also show that factors typically related to underwriters and issuers – such as proceeds, secondary sales, earnings and reputation – affect the 3.5% spread used both positively and negatively. Thus, consistent with the efficient contract theory, the use of a 3.5% contract becomes less likely as proceeds increase but becomes more likely for IPOs of over 35 (KRW billion). On the one hand, the use of a 3.5% contract becomes more likely the more insider shares an IPO contains and the higher the volatility of the stock return (an insignificant factor). On the other hand, the use of a 3.5% contract becomes less likely the higher the earnings and debt (insignificant factors) and the more reputable the underwriter. Underpricing in 3.5% IPOs is conditioned by proceeds and secondary sales, not reputation and IPO market concentration. Thus, we conclude – against the cartel theory – that there is no collusive conspiracy in the Korean IPO market and that underwriters do not reap excess profits from 3.5% IPOs.