TESTING THE SEQUENTIAL LOGIT MODEL AGAINST THE NESTED LOGIT MODEL*

In this paper, we show that the sequential logit (SL) model, in which a choice process is characterized as a sequence of independent multinomial logit models, is a limiting case of the nested logit (NL) model. For testing the SL model against the NL model, we propose Wald, likelihood ratio and Lagrange multiplier tests after suitably reparameterizing the NL model. It is found that when the NL model parameters are “weakly identified”, the Wald test severely underrejects the true model, whereas the sizes of the LR and LM tests are not significantly affected.     

SEQUENTIAL MERGERS WITH DIFFERING DIFFERENTIATION LEVELS*

We study sequential merger incentives under presence of product differentiation. Two sets of firms produce closely related goods, whereas each set produces more differentiated goods. Merger incentives under product differentiation are found to be stronger for two firms producing closely related goods than more differentiated goods. Also, after one merger, other firms are willing to follow with their own merger, resulting in sequential mergers. This result is consistent with the recent mergers in the video game software industry in Japan.     

A NONCOOPERATIVE SHIPPING COURNOT DUOPOLY WITH LINEAR‐QUADRATIC TRANSPORT COSTS AND CIRCULAR SPACE*

The mixed strategy equilibria in a location quantity duopoly model with circular markets are investigated. We find that a continuum of equilibria exists when the transport cost function is linear. However, if costs are strictly concave or convex, most strategies fail to qualify as equilibria. For any integer n, there are nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria in which each firm locates at n possible locations with equal probability. This result explains possible outcomes in which firms’ on‐path locations are not minimally or maximally differentiated.     

BOOMS AND SLUMPS IN A GAME OF SEQUENTIAL INVESTMENT WITH THE CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS

Many less developed countries have experienced prolonged periods of expansions and reversals in foreign investment inflows. This paper presents a simple game-theoretic model that can explain hysteretic patterns of serial correlation in investment behavior. We develop a sequential move game of coordinated investment played by short-run players under the changing economic environment and demonstrate that in a unique equilibrium of the game, the economy fluctuates over multiple static equilibria, generating hysteresis.