The Dynamics of Financially Constrained Arbitrage

We develop a model in which financially constrained arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies across segmented markets. We show that the dynamics of arbitrage capital are self‐correcting: following a shock that depletes capital, returns increase, which allows capital to be gradually replenished. Spreads increase more for trades with volatile fundamentals or more time to convergence. Arbitrageurs cut their positions more in those trades, except when volatility concerns the hedgeable component. Financial constraints yield a positive cross‐sectional relationship between spreads/returns and betas with respect to arbitrage capital. Diversification of arbitrageurs across markets induces contagion, but generally lowers arbitrageurs' risk and price volatility.     

Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals

We document that forced resignations of top managers are preceded by large and significant declines in operating performance and followed by large improvements in performance. However, forced resignations are rare and are due more often to external factors (e.g., blockholder pressure, takeover attempts, etc.) than to normal board monitoring. Following the management change, these firms significantly downsize their operations and are subject to a high rate of corporate control activity. Normal retirements are followed by small increases in operating income and are also subject to a slightly higher than normal incidence of postturnover corporate control activity.     

Capital Maintenance Adjustment Under the Financial (Real) Capital Concept

This paper examines the way in which the general purchasing concept of capital has been implemented in the real business income and selling price models. It presents an analysis of the conceptual aspects of the alternative methods of implementation proposed in the literature and identifies limitations in adjusting for inflation in entry price models.     

Globalization of R&D and China: An Introduction

In this introduction, we discuss the recent changes in multinational corporations' (MNCs) research and development (R&D) strategies and China's rising role in this new development. Significant changes include: 1) More and more corporations have started overseas R & D operations; 2) the missions of many overseas R&D facilities have shifted from the traditional supplementing and supporting roles to become critical and strategic components of MNCs' global R&D networks; and 3) MNC overseas R&D operations have expanded their geographic reach to carefully selected developing countries. China has benefited from such changes and has become one major attraction for such R&D facilities due to its rich endowment of low-cost and well- trained scientists and engineers as well as its fast growing domestic market and burgeoning foreign investment in manufacturing. The explosion of foreign R&D investment has also been accompanied by the rapid growth of China's domestic investment in R&D. The growth in both domestic and foreign investment in R&D implies that China will improve its position in global economic and technological competition. However, it is unclear to the rest of the world about the implications of China's rising R&D and whether or not China can capture the value from the presence of foreign R&D centres. We conclude that issues related to China's science and technology development in general and foreign R&D in China in particular warrant more research in the future.     

Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool

We study mutual‐aid games in which individuals choose to contribute to an informal mutual insurance pool. Individual coverage is determined by the aggregate level of contributions and a sharing rule. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the (ex ante) efficiency of equal and contribution‐based coverage. The equal coverage mechanism leads to a unique no‐insurance equilibrium while contribution‐based coverage develops multiple equilibria and improves efficiency. Experimentally, the latter treatment reduces the amount of transfers from high contributors to low contributors and generates a “dual interior equilibrium.” That dual equilibrium is consistent with the co‐existence of different prior norms which correspond to notable equilibria derived in the theory. This results in asymmetric outcomes with a majority of high contributors less than fully reimbursing the global losses and a significant minority of low contributors less than fully defecting. Such behavioral heterogeneity may be attributed to risk attitudes (risk tolerance vs risk aversion) which is natural in a risky context.