Project Evaluation and Accounting Income Forecasts

It is shown that the economically justifiable criterion for project evaluation of maximizing current net market value is equivalent to maximizing the discounted net cash equivalent flow. It is argued that the appropriate income concept for project evaluation is therefore the one used in the system devised by Chambers, 'Continuously Contemporary Accounting'.     

Impact of Intangible Capital on Productivity and Growth: Lessons from the Indian Information Technology Software Industry*

This paper examines the impact of intangible capital, including human capital and organisational capabilities on productivity, using India as an illustrative example. The research breaks new ground in creating measures of intangible capital at a micro level. Measures of tangible and intangible capital are used to estimate a ‘new economy’ production function with panel data. Generalised method of moments techniques are used to account for unobserved firm heterogeneity and endogenous explanatory variables. The results indicate that intangible assets have a major impact on software sector output. This has important implications for public policy and corporate strategy towards the information technology industry, including for Australia.     

Optimal Futures Positions for Large Banking Firms

In this paper, we extend earlier work on hedging models so that uncertainty about both deposit supply and loan demand is incorporated as well as random rates of return on loans and CD's. Our model suggests that the optimal forward position is the sum of three ratios that should be estimated simultaneously. Using bank-specific data, the optimal hedge ratios are estimated in both the pre-deregulation and deregulation subperiods. Our results show that previous studies of bank hedging with interest rate futures have greatly overstated (a) the volume of short futures positions that banks should take and (b) the degree of homogeneity of optimal hedge ratios across the banking system. Similarly, deregulation has not uniformly affected the interest rate risk borne by different institutions.     

Dynamic Effects of Information Disclosure on Investment Efficiency

This paper studies how information disclosure affects investment efficiency and investor welfare in a dynamic setting in which a firm makes sequential investments to adjust its capital stock over time. We show that the effects of accounting disclosures on investment efficiency and investor welfare crucially depend on whether such disclosures convey information about the firm's future capital stock (i.e., balance sheet) or about its future operating cash flows (i.e., earnings). Specifically, investment efficiency and investor welfare unambiguously increase in the precision of disclosures that convey information about the future capital stock, since such disclosures mitigate the current owners' incentives to underinvest. In contrast, when accounting reports provide information about future cash flows, the firm can have incentives to either under‐ or overinvest depending on the precision of accounting reports and the expected growth in demand. For such disclosures, investment efficiency and investor welfare are maximized by an intermediate level of precision. The two types of accounting disclosures act as substitutes in that the precision of capital stock disclosures that maximizes investment efficiency (and investor welfare) decreases as cash flow disclosures become more informative and vice versa.     

Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability

We evaluate how governance uncertainty—exemplified by turnout uncertainty—affects the trade‐off between internalization of externalities and political accountability in the design of the fiscal state. We show that centralization only weakens political accountability in the presence of negative externalities. Unlike positive externalities, negative externalities allow federal politicians to extract higher rents. This yields two new insights. First, decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities. Second, centralization may not be Pareto efficient in economies with positive externalities despite the fact that policy can be tailored to regional taste differences and centralization internalizes the positive externality.     

Does Inequality Foster Corruption?

In this paper, we investigate how inequality affects corruption in the presence of an imperfect credit market. We favor an explanation based on a multimarket framework where corruption in one market (or sector) arises because of imperfections exacerbated by inequality in related markets. We demonstrate that even when an individual's ability to pay bribes and benefit from engaging in corruption are not affected by wealth level, greater (wealth) inequality will lead to an increase in corruption.     

Competition and Collusion in Dealer Markets

This article develops a game-theoretic model to analyze market makers' intertemporal pricing strategies. We show that dealers who adopt noncooperative pricing strategies may set bid-ask spreads above competitive levels. This form of “implicit collusion” differs from explicit collusion, where dealers cooperate to fix prices. Price discreteness or asymmetric information are not required for collusion to occur. Rather, institutional arrangements that restrict access to the order flow are important determinants of the ability to collude because they reduce dealers' incentives to compete on price. Public policy efforts to increase interdealer competition should focus on such restrictions.     

Earnings Announcements and Market Depth*

Abstract. This paper investigates how strategic trading around the time of earnings announcements affects market liquidity (e.g., bid-ask spreads). We model an investor with private information in advance of an earnings announcement (e.g., inside information). The investor trades before and after the earnings announcement in a market populated by liquidity-motivated traders who have some discretion over the timing of their trades. The main result of the analysis is that an earnings announcement that reduces an insider's private information may lead to a less liquid market in the postannouncement period.     

The Purchasing Power of Money and Nominal Interest Rates: A Re-Examination

While it has been known for some time that, under uncertainty, the original version of the Fisher hypothesis is not precisely correct, empirical researchers have largely ignored this fact. Such an omission has possibly resulted in erroneous conclusions concerning other hypotheses; most notably the impact of prices on the real economy. This paper clarifies some of the previous interpretations of the existing empirical literature and provides a theoretical version of the relation between prices and interest rates. Empirical tests based on both the Livingston survey data and data from time-series forecasting models provide support for the Fisher effect and the hypothesis that only covariance risk is priced in the Treasury bill market.