Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation

I propose a bribery model that examines decentralized bureaucratic decision‐making. There are multiple stable equilibria. High levels of bribery reduce an economy's productivity because corruption suppresses small business, and reduces the total graft, even though the size of an individual bribe might increase. Decentralization prevents movement towards a Pareto‐dominant equilibrium. Anticorruption efforts, even temporary ones, might be useful to improve participation, if they lower the bribe levels demanded and thus encourage small businesses to participate.     

Correlation estimation using components of Japanese candlesticks

Using the wick’s difference from the classical Japanese candlestick representation of daily open, high, low, close prices brings efficiency when estimating the correlation in a bivariate Brownian motion. An interpretation of the correlation estimator given in [Rogers, L.C.G. and Zhou, F., Estimating correlation from high, low, opening and closing prices. Ann. Appl. Probab., 2008, 18(2), 813–823] in the light of wicks’ difference allows us to suggest modifications, which lead to an increased efficiency and robustness over the baseline model. An empirical study of four major financial markets confirms the advantages of the modified estimator.     

Inequality and volatility moderation in Russia: Evidence from micro-level panel data on consumption and income

We construct key household and individual economic variables using a panel micro data set from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) for 1994–2005. We analyze cross-sectional income and consumption inequality trends and find that inequality decreased during the 2000–2005 economic recovery. The decrease appears to be driven by falling volatility of transitory income shocks. The response of consumption to permanent and transitory income shocks becomes weaker later in the sample, consistent with greater self-insurance against permanent shocks and greater smoothing of transitory shocks. Finally, expenditure and income inequality in Russia are not far apart.     

Allocation of public funds to R&;D: a portfolio choice-styled decision model and a biotechnology case study

A decision problem—allocating public research and development (R&D) funding—is faced by a planner who has ambiguous knowledge of welfare effects of the various research areas. We model this as a reverse portfolio choice problem faced by a Bayesian decision-maker. Two elements of the planner’s inferential system are developed: a conditional distribution of welfare ‘returns’ on an allocation, given stated preferences of citizens for the different areas, and a minimum risk criterion for re-allocating these funds, given the performance of a status quo level of funding. A case study of Canadian public research funds expended on various applications of agricultural biotechnology is provided. The decision-making methodology can accommodate a variety of collective expenditure and resource allocation problems.     

Empirical Analysis of Consumer Purchase Behavior: Interaction Between State Dependence and Sensitivity to Marketing-Mix Variables1

People are intent to make similar choices especially in consumer goods markets. To address both explanations of this persistence, i.e. state dependence and heterogeneity in preferences, we use random coefficient logit model based on scanner panel data on juice purchases. The product differentiation of the chosen category allows us to model three dimensions of state dependence on brand, size and flavor characteristics. We provide evidence that the persistence in brand choices is positively correlated with persistence in size and flavor choices, thus the consumer pattern is prone to be inertial or variety seeking in every product characteristics. Simultaneously we show that the more sensitive to price and promotional activities consumers are, the less inertial is their behavior.     

Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts

I consider an environment in which contract enforcement is a decision variable for the principal. I construct a model in which entrepreneurs cannot commit to repaying investors for the capital advanced, but investors can force repayment by spending resources. The principal uses enforcement to reduce the resources available to the agent after a default, thus providing incentives for the agent to stay in the relationship. She also ensures contract compliance by backloading the payments to the agent: expected utility rises over time, preventing a default. I consider an application of the framework developed in the paper to the area of firm dynamics. I show that enforcement and backloading are always used jointly. Firm size (measured by capital) grows with time and each firm converges to the efficient size. A second application is to the field of economic development. Costlier enforcement leads to the choice of sub-optimal technology; secondly, it leads to inefficient dispersion of capital across establishments.     

The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game

The Colonel Blotto game is a two-player constant-sum game in which each player simultaneously distributes his fixed level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players?? resources are ??use it or lose it?? in the sense that any resources that are not allocated to one of the contests are forfeited. This article examines a non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game that relaxes this use it or lose it feature. We find that if the level of asymmetry between the players?? budgets is below a threshold, then there exists a one-to-one mapping from the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distribution functions in the constant-sum game to those in the non-constant-sum game. Once the asymmetry of the players?? budgets exceeds the threshold, this relationship breaks down and we construct a new equilibrium.     

Contests with limited resources

Many interesting phenomena (electoral competition, R&D races, lobbying) are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources. Specifically, the following game is analyzed. Two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests. The players have limited resources (budgets) and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests. In each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize. Mixed-strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical Blotto game are analyzed.