Competition Among Universities and the Emergence of the Élite Institution

We consider an environment where two education institutions compete by selecting the proportion of their funding devoted to teaching and research and the criteria for admission for their students, and where students choose whether and where to attend university. We study the relationship between the cost incurred by students for attending a university located away from their home town and the equilibrium configuration that emerges in the game played by the universities. Symmetric equilibria, where universities choose the same admission standard, only exist when the mobility cost is high; when the mobility cost is very low, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. For intermediate values of the mobility cost, only asymmetric equilibria may exist; the final section of the paper provides an example where asymmetric equilibria do indeed exist for a plausible and robust set of parameters.     

A model of growth with inherited tastes

This research aims at studying a general equilibrium closed economy with overlapping generations and inherited tastes (aspirations), as in de la Croix (Econ Lett 53(1):89–96, 1996). It shows that the interaction between the intensity of aspirations and the elasticity of substitution of effective consumption affects the qualitative and quantitative long-term dynamics from both local and global perspectives. The related literature is extended by showing that (1) the Neimark–Sacker bifurcation found by de la Croix (1996) does not necessarily give rise to fluctuations and (2) endogenous (long-lasting) fluctuations occur through the emergence of period-doubling bifurcations.     

Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Affect Investment and Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian Firms

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion, and overinvestment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians, and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE's investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and overinvestment. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; and CERIS–CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, National Research Council, Via Avogadro, 8, 10121 Turin, Italy. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.     

How does technological innovation and diffusion affect inter-industry workers’ mobility?

Does technological change amount to accumulation of general, and so transferable, human capital? To approach this question I rely on a theoretical framework in which the “technology distance” between industries reduces inter-industry transferability of workers’ skill. Empirically, I use US panel data on individual intra-industry and inter-industry mobility decisions between 1982 and 1990, a period of rapid technological change in all manufacturing sectors, to estimate a mixed logit econometric specification that does not rely on the IIA assumption. I find support to the main idea that technological innovation and diffusion have different effects on workers’ industrial mobility patterns. “Knowledge spillovers”, differently from “rent spillovers”, indeed boost the chances of workers’ inter-industry mobility. Surprisingly, this is more consistently so in low-tech industries than in high-tech industries. Consistently with the expectations developed in the theoretical framework, in low-tech industries skilled workers respond more sharply to technology diffusion than unskilled workers.     

Product quality, lender liability, and consumer credit

Under ‘linked credit’ (also known as ‘connectedlending’), the buyer obtains a loan from a lender withthe specific purpose of purchasing a certain product. Creditis arranged directly by the seller, who acts as an intermediaryfor the finance company. Within this form of financing, thelender often accepts a measure of liability for defective products.We show that ‘connected-lender liability’ can workas a signalling device for the reliability of sellers, so asto alleviate the market failure that arises when sellers arebetter informed than consumers about the quality of their products.     

The Role of Commercial Non-profit Organizations in the Provision of Public Services

In this paper we discuss the role of commercial non-profit firmsin the provision of public services, referring to three casestudies to illustrate the main issues. We consider problemsof corporate governance, including the role of the board ofmembers and the scope for performance-related pay. We discussthe performance of such non-profit firms in terms of qualityand costs, the particular finance problems of these firms andthe implications for risk taking. We also suggest various aspectsof non-profit behaviour in public service provision that presentinteresting avenues for future research.