The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments

Belief elicitation is an important methodological issue for experimental economists. There are two generic questions: 1) Do incentives increase belief accuracy? 2) Are there interaction effects of beliefs and decisions? We investigate these questions in the case of finitely repeated public goods experiments. We find that belief accuracy is significantly higher when beliefs are incentivized. The relationship between contributions and beliefs is slightly steeper under incentives. However, we find that incentivized beliefs tend to lead to higher contribution levels than either non-incentivized beliefs or no beliefs at all. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of public good experiments.     

Geothermische Stromerzeugung in Deutschland — Stiefkind oder schlafender Riese?

This contribution analyses the development of power generation from geothermal energy in Germany. It considers research funding schemes, the support through the german Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) and the role of decisive actors as well as technical, economic and societal framework conditions. Compared to other renewable energy sources research funding for geothermal energy had played an inferior role in the past. After the potentials for geothermal power generation had been underlined by a study in 2003, geothermal power gained more political and institutional advocates. Subsequently it was equipped with a higher tariff in the EEG 2004 and led to realization of demonstration projects. Yet, the appliance of technologies for electrical power transformation, ORC and Kalina, are at the very beginning. Presently, the geothermal energy industry consists of a small amount of medium-sized businesses. Regional and nationwide energy providers, acting as operators and investors, do not exert much pressure in view of limited returns. Despite the compatibility with existing power supply systems, constraints to the expansion of geothermal energy use — above all exploration risks and high drilling costs- are likely to lead to a step-by step enhancement rather than a rush.     

ALICE: Composite leading indicators for euro area inflation cycles

This paper develops Area-wide Leading Inflation CyclE (ALICE) indicators with the aim to provide early signals for turning points in the euro area headline and core inflation cycles. The headline (core) ALICE leads the reference cycle by three (four) months and the lead times extend to five (nine) months based on longer-leading series. Both ALICE indicators signalled turning points in the inflation cycles ex post and also performed well in a simulated real-time exercise. Moreover, in particular the headline ALICE also appeared to be useful for quantitative forecasting of the direction and level of inflation.     

Kurz kommentiert

Kurz kommentiert

Kurz kommentiert     

Extremity in horizontal and vertical Likert scale format responses. Some evidence on how visual distance between response categories influences extreme responding

In four survey experiments we show that people generally answer more extremely to survey items presented in vertical versus horizontal Likert formats. Our findings suggest that this effect may be at least partly driven by differences in the visual range spanned by the response scale (i.e. the visual distance between endpoint response categories is larger in horizontal than in a vertical format). In addition, compared to traditional horizontal Likert data, vertical Likert data contain more variance, which is mainly non-substantive. As a result, data obtained with scale formats that have different distances between response categories (as is typically the case for vertical vs. horizontal formats) may lead to differences in measurement model parameter estimates like residual terms, and in some cases factor loadings and construct correlations. Based on these results, we provide recommendations on the use of response scale formats in online surveys, bearing in mind that several online survey tool providers promote the use of vertical Likert formats and even automatically change traditional horizontal formats of Likert-type items to vertical Likert formats when viewed on small screens (e.g., on mobile phones).     

Gesundheitsfonds — effizientere Steuerung des Gesundheitssystems?

In 2009 the German central health fund was implemented. It was the result of a political compromise. One political party intended to equalise the risk structure among 130 different health care funds, and the other wanted to intensify competition and to improve efficiency among the different health insurances. The fund is flanked by a health-based risk adjustment and is aimed at sustainably ensuring the funding of the statutory health insurance system. It also constitutes the basis for competition among statutory health care funds, securing quality and efficiency in health care provision. To cover additional expenditures, health insurers had to charge flatrate premiums. A new law, which will come into effect in January 2015, will oblige health insurers to charge income related contributions. It is not clear how this will change competition among insurers. The federal government will not need to finance subsidies to low income individuals anymore. Income redistribution will only take place within the public health insurance system, exempting the privately insured and public servants from supporting low income individuals. The authors claim that the health care fund will not succeed in its aim of securing a sustainable financial basis for the statutory health insurance system. Most of the authors argue that there is no evidence of greater efficiency thus far, and they offer proposals on how to achieve improved performance.     

An Experimental Bribery Game

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocityrelationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negativewelfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. Weseparate the influences of these factors in an experiment. Ina two-player game, reciprocation is economically inefficientthrough negative externalities. A control treatment withoutexternalities is also conducted. In a third, so-called suddendeath treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusionfrom the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocitycan establish bribery relationships, where negative externalitieshave no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reducescorruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated.