Board Gender Diversity: Challenges and Implications for Corporations in the East African Community

ABSTRACT

East African Community’s (EAC) corporations are required to follow a regional treaty of mainstreaming gender equality. This article discusses challenges encountered by corporate boards of the EAC’s corporations when adding women. Agency and resource dependence theories led the study, while a review of the literature was the methodology. We discuss the benefits of diverse boards and challenges faced when developing this diversity. We show how power distance, masculinity, and certainty avoidance prevent women from corporate boards. Furthermore, we discuss how social orientation and business environment impact women’s participation. The article discusses various strategies to be considered for increasing diversity.     

Justifiable preferences

We characterize preferences over acts that can be represented by a utility function and a multiple-prior, such that an act f is preferred to act g if there is a prior under which the expected utility induced by f is higher than that induced by g. These preferences are referred to as justifiable preferences. We further introduce a generalized model of ambiguity that involves a collection of multiple-priors, namely, multiple multiple-priors and incorporate Bewley?s Knightian model in justifiability: f is preferred to g if, according to at least one set of priors, f is unanimously preferred to g.     

Matching using semiparametric propensity scores

This paper considers the application of semiparametric methods to estimate propensity scores or probabilities of program participation, which are central to certain program evaluation methods. To evaluate the practical benefits, we first conduct a Monte Carlo study. Second, we use data from the NSW experiment, CPS, and PSID. We compare treatment effect and evaluation bias estimates using propensity scores estimated from parametric logit, semiparametric single index, and semiparametric binary quantile regression models. Our results suggest that it is important to account for very general forms of heterogeneity in (semiparametric) estimation of the propensity score, particularly when the treatment effects vary in an unsystematic manner with the true propensity score.     

National Identity and the Challenge of Health Reform in Canada

Health reform remains the most contentious policy issue in Canada. Medicare is subject to the same political forces that demand state retrenchment in other areas, but it has escaped wholesale reorganization because of the commitment of Canadians to the principles of medicare, because the provinces and the federal government remain locked in a battle about provincial autonomy, and because the existing system serves the interests of various professional groups including organized medicine. Nevertheless, reform and, especially, expansion of coverage is essential if the existing system is to be sustained. The most encouraging aspect of current debate is the recognition that we can look beyond the U.S. for reforms more consistent with the underlying values of Canadians than is the U.S. system.     

Cognitive Theory and Moral Behavior: The Contribution of F. A. Hayek to Business Ethics

This paper shows how business ethics as a concept may be approached from a cognitive viewpoint. Following F. A. Hayek's cognitive theory, I argue that moral behavior evolves and changes because of individual perception and action. Individual moral behavior becomes a moral rule when prominently displayed by members of a certain society in a specific situation. A set of moral rules eventually forms the ethical code of a society, of which business ethics codes are only a part. By focusing on the concept of "limited" or "dispersed knowledge" that underlies the cognitive approach, I show that universal ethical norms that should lead to defined outcomes cannot exist. This approach moreover shows the limits of deliberate rule-setting. Attempts to deliberately impose universal ethical rules on societies may turn out to be harmful for societal development and lead to an abuse of governmental power.     

The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information

We present a model of anonymous collective bargaining where individuals'preferences and information may be significantly interdependent. We showthat the bargaining outcome becomes independent of individuals'preferences and information as the bargaining group increases in size. As acorollary, we show that anonymous voluntary bargaining completely fails inlarge groups. Either the difference between the bargaining outcome and thestatus quo vanishes as the size of the group becomes larger, or, thebargaining becomes coercive and results in a violation of at least someindividuals' rights. The result provides a rationale for the inherentdifficulty of reform in the presence of asymmetric information.
"There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful ofsuccess, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order ofthings."
Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (1532)     

CUSTOMER SERVICE IN THE INTERNET‐ENABLED LOGISTICS SUPPLY CHAIN: WEBSITE DESIGN ANTECEDENTS AND LOYALTY EFFECTS

This article extends the existing research on logistics customer service‐loyalty relationships to the online logistics supply chain environment by examining potential website determinants of logistics customer service quality. A structural equation analysis of 373 online shopping transactions suggests that perceived quality of all logistics customer service activities (perceived cycle time, in‐stock availability, and customer responsiveness) varies inversely with: (1) perceived ease of use, and (2) content vividness of the website; and positively with product information content. However, only retailer customer responsiveness assessment was found to have any significant influence on consumer intended loyalty behavior in Internet‐enabled supplies chains.     

Voluntary Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information: A Complete Equilibrium Characterization

The so-called disclosure principle is a 'puzzle' in the accounting literature: Game theoretic models of financial markets show that in equilibrium firms should disclose all their private information. Yet, the result is not convincing. Researchers have therefore built sophisticated models in order to demonstrate for which reasons the disclosure principle might fail. This note shows that even in the original model there are multiple equilibria. In those equilibria good types disclose and bad types do not. The commonly known full disclosure equilibrium is a limit point of the equilibrium set.