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Sergei Guriev Evgeny Yakovlev Ekaterina Zhuravskaya 《Journal of public economics》2010,94(9-10):730-748
The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996–2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups. Our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter-state externalities. 相似文献
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A. A. Yakovlev 《Studies on Russian Economic Development》2006,17(6):662-665
This paper shows and explains the dependence of the period during which a class C car is manufactured on its final demand, as well as calculates the price and age elasticity of demand in each year of the car’s life cycle. 相似文献
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We review some of the work on non-Gibbsian states of the last 10 years, emphasizing the developments in which Eurandom played a role. 相似文献
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This article proposes a new explanation for the large cross-sectionalvariation in the excess values of diversified firms. The modelapplies the idea of shareholders' limited liability affectingfirms' output market strategies to the analysis of financialand operating choices of conglomerates. The inability of conglomeratesto commit to unconstrained optimal operating strategies, followingfrom the lack of flexibility in choosing their divisions' capitalstructures, reduces their value. Thus, the model highlightsa new type of inefficiency of the conglomerate organizationalstructure, which is suboptimal financing. The predictions ofthe model are generally supported by the data. 相似文献
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The establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010, succeeded by the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, constituted an important discontinuity in the development of post-Soviet regionalism: while the preceding organisations remained cases of ‘ink-on-paper’ regional integration, in the case of the Customs Union the members actually implemented their commitments. This creates an important theoretical challenge: the literature (which the previous experience of Eurasian regionalism was very much in line with) conjectures that authoritarian states are unable to successfully implement an economic regional integration agreement (RIA). The aim of the article is to explore the conditions under which implementation of economic RIAs by autocracies happens. We argue that the implementation is influenced by the extent of economic, social and political ties between member states, and suggest that, unlike democratic states, which are more likely to implement a RIA where there are strong economic ties, non-democracies are more likely to do so in the case of intermediate economic dependence. 相似文献
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This paper examines how competition among suppliers affects their willingness to provide trade credit financing. Trade credit extended by a supplier to a cash constrained retailer allows the latter to increase cash purchases from its other suppliers, leading to a free rider problem. A supplier that represents a smaller share of the retailer’s purchases internalizes a smaller part of the benefit from increased spending by the retailer and, as a result, extends less trade credit relative to its sales. In consequence, retailers with dispersed suppliers obtain less trade credit than those whose suppliers are more concentrated. The free rider problem is especially detrimental to a trade creditor when the free-riding suppliers are its product market competitors, leading to a negative relation between product substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer and trade credit that the former provide to the latter. We test the model using both simulated and real data. The estimated relations are consistent with the model’s predictions and are statistically and economically significant. 相似文献
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We generalize the usual screening approach and conditions for efficiency-at-the-top and acyclic property from linear to fixed-plus-separable or concave costs and multidimensional commodities. But under non-concave costs, like capacity constraints, an example shows a cycle in the solution graph. The cycle makes the standard screening solution non-implementable and approach inadequate. 相似文献
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Substituting Distribution for Growth: The Political Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers in the Russian Federation
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Given limited resources and economic realities, how do politicians distribute monetary transfers in order to retain office? Previous work has largely focused on two models – a core model of rewarding loyal supporters and a swing model of purchasing the support of easily swayed voters. Empirical results have proven mixed, however. In this article, we argue that these mixed results are due to economic factors, which condition politicians' distributive strategies. In our model, we consider that politician and voters are involved in a repeated game, where past expectations condition future strategy. Current (core) supporters who receive few benefits and perceive themselves worse off than other, less loyal, groups are likely to be less loyal themselves tomorrow. In our model, politicians avoid this by providing their supporters consumption benefits directly, in the form of transfers, or indirectly, via strong economic growth. Where economic growth is good, politicians can distribute less to core supporters, who benefit from the rising economy. Where economic growth is weak, however, politicians make transfers to their core supporters to ensure future loyalty. We test our theory using data on federal transfers from the Russian Federal government to 78 Russian Regions from 2000–2008. 相似文献
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Evgeny V. Popov Victoria L. Simonova 《International Advances in Economic Research》2006,12(1):115-123
The purpose of the paper is to discuss the development of the theoretical approach to a rating of the opportunism between
the principals and agents within the framework of the neo-institutional theory. The matrix of the opportunistic forms between
the principals and agents designed. On the basis of the carried out experimental research of firms of the Ural region of Russia,
such opportunistic forms of the agents such as flubbing, negligence, and malversation were investigated. The experimental
dependences of an opportunistic level of the agents from a level of wages, level of non-financial stimulus, effectiveness
of punishment, share of creative element of labor, and degree of labor specificity are defined.
Financial support for the grant from the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fond, No. 05-02-83214a is acknowledged. 相似文献