Protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing

Abstract .  Grossman and Helpman (1994) explain tariffs as the outcome of a lobbying process. In most empirical implementations of this framework protection is instead measured using non-tariff barriers. Since tariffs allow the government to fully capture the rents from protection, while non-tariff barriers do not, the existing parameter estimates of the protection for sale model are likely to be biased. To address this problem, we augment the framework by considering instruments that allow partial capturing. Our specification is supported by the data, where we find that only 72–75% of the rent from protection is appropriated by the government.     

Growth at the EU periphery: the next enlargement

In 2004, 75 million people are scheduled to become EU citizens, making this the largest round of expansion of the Western European club to date. Of the 10 new entrants, 8 are former socialist economies, for which membership in the EU represents the coronation of an effort began with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. Based on their recent economic performance, the Central and Eastern European countries appear to be well on their way to successfully integrate in the Western European club, while the Baltic Republics still lag behind. The gap between the two groups emerges when we consider the adjustment of the production structure, the composition of trade and FDI flows, and income distribution. The evidence we review appears to support the role of institutional quality to facilitate integration in the world market and overall economic performance.     

Migration,Friendship Ties,and Cultural Assimilation

We study immigrant assimilation by analyzing whether friendship with natives is a measure of cultural assimilation, and by investigating the formation of social ties. Using the German Socio‐Economic Panel, we find that immigrants with a German friend are more similar to natives than those without German friends, along several important dimensions, including concerns about the economy, an interest in politics, and a host of policy issues. Turning to friendship acquisition, we find that becoming employed, time spent in the host country, the birth of a child, residential mobility, and additional education acquired in the host country are significant drivers of social network variation.     

Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?

While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration policy across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobbying expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important.     

What Are the Determinants of Public Spending? An Overview of the Literature

Atlantic Economic Journal - The purpose of this paper is to present and assess the literature about the determinants of public spending. Its originality is the adoption of a methodological...     

Cultural differences,insecure property rights and the mode of entry decision

We develop a theory of a multinational corporation’s optimal mode of entry in a new market. The foreign firm can choose between a licensing agreement, a wholly owned subsidiary or shared control (joint venture). In an environment in which property rights are insecure, opportunism is possible, and the identification of new business opportunities is costly, we show that the relationship between the quality of the institutional environment and the mode of entry decision is non-monotonic. Licensing is preferred if property rights are strictly enforced, while a joint venture is chosen when property rights are poorly enforced. For intermediate situations, the better use of local knowledge made possible by shared control under a joint venture works as a double edged sword. On the one hand, it makes the monitoring activity of the multinational more credible, on the other it offers insurance to both parties, potentially compromising the incentives faced by the local partner. We are grateful to the Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano for providing financial support. For useful comments we would like to thank Klaus Desmet, Cecilia Testa, Henry Wan and Gerald Willmann and seminar participants at Cornell, Ente Luigi Einaudi, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Kiel, Milano, Universidad de Sao Paolo, the Midwest International Economics Meetings in Indianapolis, SAET VI conference in Rhodes, and the City University of Hong Kong Conference on Intellectual Property Rights.     

The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress

We compare the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970s. Standard trade theory suggests that trade reforms that lower barriers to goods from less skilled‐labor abundant countries and migration reforms that lower barriers to low‐skilled migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low‐skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high‐skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled‐labor abundant districts are more likely to support trade and migration reforms that benefit high‐skilled workers. Still, important differences exist: Democrats are less supportive of trade reforms than Republicans, while the opposite is true for migration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape votes on migration, but not on trade.     

Labour Costs and the Size of Government

Given inelastic demand for labour‐intensive public services, the size of government depends positively on labour costs. OECD data exhibit a strong statistical association between government size and the business‐sector labour share of income. When the labour share is instrumented with measures of technological change, institutional variation and predetermined data it continues to positively impact government size. In contrast, transfer spending is unaffected by the labour share. The evidence is consistent with the idea that the recent decline in the labour share has contributed to the slowdown in the growth of government witnessed in much of the post‐war era.     

Hub‐and‐spoke free trade areas: theory and evidence from Israel

Abstract We study how the sequential formation of free trade areas affects trade flows between member countries. In a three‐country, three‐good model of comparative advantage if two countries have an FTA, and both sign a similar agreement with the third, trade between the two decreases. However, if only one of them signs an additional FTA, a hub‐ and‐spoke pattern arises, and trade between the initial members increases. Israel’s experience lends strong support to our model: trade between Israel and the EU, subject to an FTA since 1975, increased by an additional 29% after the introduction of the US‐Israel FTA in 1985.