Trader associations and urban food systems in Ghana: institutionalist approaches to understanding urban collective action

This article explores the activities and functioning of urban food trader associations in Ghana. These associations are strong indigenous groups of women traders who have been able to sustain cooperation over many years in contrast to many other forms of collective action. They shape urban food systems and link urban consumers with rural producers. The analysis relates the findings to the literature on socio‐economics, institutional economics and collective action. Of particular interest are the social relations and networks within associations that allow traders to access informal credit and information with contracts based on trust. The factors that contribute to the ability to sustain collective action are explored. These include leadership structures and acceptance of the authority of market queens by other women traders, as well as the need to have the benefits that come from membership of associations. Cet article porte sur les activités et le fonctionnement d'associations urbaines de commerce alimentaire au Ghana. Il s'agit de puissants groupes autochtones de marchandes qui ont pu préserver une coopération sur de nombreuses années, contrairement à bien d'autres formes d'action collective. Ces associations configurent les systèmes d'approvisionnement des villes, reliant consommateurs urbains et producteurs ruraux. L'analyse rapproche résultats et références documentaires en socio‐économie, économie institutionnelle et action collective. On soulignera les relations et réseaux sociaux au sein des associations, lesquels permettent aux commerçantes d'accéder à des sources parallèles d'information et de crédit sur la base de contrats de confiance. L'article étudie les facteurs facilitant la pérennisation d'une action collective, notamment les structures de leadership et la reconnaissance de l'autorité de reines du marché par d'autres commerçantes, ainsi que la nécessité de tirer des avantages de l'appartenance à ces associations.     

Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure under Threat of Audit

We develop an economic model of “greenwash,” in which a firm strategically discloses environmental information and an activist may audit and penalize the firm for disclosing positive but not negative aspects of its environmental profile. We fully characterize the model's equilibria, and derive a variety of predictions about disclosure behavior. We rationalize conflicting results in the empirical literature, finding a nonmonotonic relationship between a firm's expected environmental performance and its environmental disclosures. Greater activist pressure deters greenwash, but induces some firms to disclose less about their environmental performance. Environmental management systems discourage firms with poor expected environmental performance from greenwashing, which may justify public policies encouraging firms to adopt them.     

Does the Delphi process lead to increased accuracy in group-based judgmental forecasts or does it simply induce consensus amongst judgmental forecasters?

We investigate the relative impact of internal Delphi process factors - including panelists' degree of confidence, expertise, majority/minority positioning - and an external factor, richness of feedback - on opinion change and subsequent accuracy of judgmental forecasts. We found that panelists who had low confidence in their judgmental forecast and/or who were in a minority were more likely to change their opinion than those who were more confident and/or in a majority. The addition of rationales, or reasons, to the numeric feedback had little impact upon panelists' final forecasts, despite the quality of panelists' rationales being significantly positively correlated with accurate forecasts and thus of potential use to aid forecast improvement over Delphi rounds. Rather, the effect of rationales was similar to that of confidence: to pull panelists towards the majority opinion regardless of its correctness. We conclude that majority opinion is the strongest influence on panelists' opinion change in both the ‘standard’ Delphi, and Delphi-with-reasons. We make some suggestions for improved variants of the Delphi-with-reasons technique that should help reduce majority influence and thereby permit reasoned arguments to exert their proper pull on opinion change, resulting in forecast accuracy improvements over Delphi rounds.     

Does Disclosure Reduce Pollution? Evidence from India’s Green Rating Project

Public disclosure programs that collect and disseminate information about firms’ environmental performance are increasingly popular in both developed and developing countries. Yet little is known about whether they actually improve environmental performance, particularly in the latter setting. We use detailed plant-level survey data to evaluate the impact of India’s Green Rating Project (GRP) on the environmental performance of the country’s largest pulp and paper plants. We find that the GRP drove significant reductions in pollution loadings among dirty plants but not among cleaner ones. This result comports with statistical and anecdotal evaluations of similar disclosure programs. We also find that plants located in wealthier communities were more responsive to GRP ratings, as were single-plant firms.     

Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem

"Buyer-option" contracts, in which the buyer selects the productvariant to be traded and chooses whether to accept delivery,are often used to solve holdup problems. We present a simplegame that focuses sharply on subgames in which the buyer proposesinefficient actions in order to improve his bargaining position.We argue for one of several alternative ways to model this situation.We then apply that modeling choice to recent models of the foundationsof incomplete contracts and show that a buyer-option contractis sufficient to induce first-best outcomes.     

The International Activities of Japanese Retailers

Despite the upsurge of academic and commercial interest in the changes taking place in the retail sector within Japan, little has been published on the international activities of Japanese retailers. This paper illustrates the range and scale of activities.which have been undertaken by such companies. While Europe and America were favourite destinations up until the mid-1980s, most Japanese retailers have now refocused their expansion plans on Asia as the level of consumers' disposable income has risen and trade barriers have been lowered. At the same time, the early entrants into international markets, the development stores, have been joined by companies operating supermarkets, convenience stores, clothing stores, electrical outlets and so on. The paper considers the nature of these changes and the factors which have driven them.     

Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy

We study three corporate nonmarket strategies designed to influence the lobbying behavior of other special interest groups: (1) astroturf , in which the firm covertly subsidizes a group with similar views to lobby when it normally would not; (2) the bear hug , in which the firm overtly pays a group to alter its lobbying activities; and (3) self-regulation , in which the firm voluntarily limits the potential social harm from its activities. All three strategies reduce the informativeness of lobbying, and all reduce the payoff of the public decision-maker. We show that the decision-maker would benefit by requiring the public disclosure of funds spent on astroturf lobbying but that the availability of alternative influence strategies limits the impact of such a policy.