The endless need for regulation in telecommunication: An explanation

Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling.     

Micro-level product-market dynamics: Shared knowledge and its relationship to market development

This work draws on consumer and psychology research to explain sociocognitive aspects of product-market dynamics at a higher level of specificity than prior research. The authors extend the field’s understanding of market-shaping shared knowledge through a theory-informed discussion of how shared product knowledge comes to exist and how it changes as product markets develop. They define shared knowledge as the aspects of product representations that are common across the minds of market actors, making it possible for them to understand one another. The authors also discuss ways to track shared knowledge content that is expressed in market narratives. As the characteristics of shared knowledge are explained and linked to stages of product-market development, the authors develop a set of researchable propositions to guide future research. The theoretical arguments and propositions in this article complement extant marketing strategy research by integrating individual-level consumer theory with market evolution models. José Antonio Rosa (jose.rosa@case.edu; Ph.D., University of Michigan) is an assistant professor of marketing at Case Western Reserve University. His research interests include product markets as sociocognitive phenomena, embodied knowledge in consumer and managerial sensemaking, consumer illiteracy and coping, commitment and motivation among members of network marketing organizations, and buying group satisfaction. His research has been published in marketing and management publications, including theJournal of Marketing and theAcademy of Management Journal. Before entering academia, he worked in the automotive and information systems industries. Jelena Spanjol (jspanjol@tamu.edu; Ph.D., University of Illinois) is an assistant professor of marketing at Texas A&M University. Her research interests include product market dynamics, product portfolio management, innovation, sensemaking, and organizational and managerial cognition in marketing strategy. Her research has been published in marketing and management publications, including theJournal of Marketing and several book chapters. Before academia, she worked in the scientific software industry.     

Multi-stage real option evaluation with double barrier under stochastic volatility and interest rate

Annals of Finance - This paper focuses on valuing R&D projects using a twofold compound real option by including two knock-out barriers. However, the valuation of R&D projects is...     

Changing rewards in contests: Has the three-point rule brought more offense to soccer?

In the mid-nineties FIFA decided to increase from two to three the number of points assigned to the winning team of a soccer match played under traditional round-robin national leagues. Since a game of soccer can be regarded as a contest, FIFA's measure provides an interesting case-study for analysing how a change in the system of rewards (from a zero to a non-zero sum rule) may affect the contestants' equilibrium behaviour. In this paper we try to assess, both theoretically and empirically, whether FIFA's new point rule has changed soccer towards a more offensive game, in which teams adopt more risky strategies. In particular, we evaluate the “na?ve hypothesis” according to which the measure would induce every team to play always more offensively, and we explore the extent to which the change in teams' behaviour may be affected by quality differentials between teams. Our most important hypothesis is that when the asymmetry between opposing teams is large enough, an increase in the reward for victory induces the weaker team to play more defensively, rather than the opposite. By looking at a subset of matches held in the Portuguese first division league, which approximate the conditions of our model, we find support for this hypothesis. First version received: July 1999/Final version received: May 2001     

Agglomeration effects in Europe

The paper estimates agglomeration effects for France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. Estimation takes into account endogeneity of the spatial distribution of employment and spatial fixed effects. Empirical results suggest that agglomeration effects in these European countries are only slightly smaller than agglomeration effects in the US: the estimated elasticity of (average) labor productivity with respect to employment density is 4.5 percent compared to 5 percent in the US.     

The dynamics and revealed preference of status-quo optimality

Summary In a preceding companion paper, a static model of individual decision making was proposed that, due to imprecise perceptions, induces simple and inertial behavior at equilibrium (status-quo optimal) points. This paper addresses two complementary issues. Firstly, it studies the learning dynamics induced by the model and shows that its well-defined limit behavior ranges from status-quo optimal to fully optimal, depending on the underlying features of the problem. Secondly, the paper characterizes the behavioral implications of the model and compares them with those derived from standard decision-theoretic frameworks. Specifically, it is shown that, from a Revealed-Preference perspective, status-quo optimal behavior may be identified with that rationalizable by an acyclic preference relation, possibly intransitive.     

A complete characterization of Pareto optimality for general OLG economies

In the context of general pure exchange OLG economies where agents can have heterogeneous longevities, we provide both sufficient and necessary conditions for Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria. For the case in which all agents live for the same number of periods, we find that these conditions are equivalent. We also find this equivalence when agents can have different lifetimes, but in this case we need to impose particular restrictions on relative equilibrium prices. Moreover, we show that without these conditions on prices the equivalence, and hence a full characterization, is not necessarily obtained.     

Technological change, human capital update and growth policies

This paper presents a model of growth driven simultaneously by innovation and human capital accumulation. Two different long-run equilibria are possible, according to whether or not workers skills are completely updated over time as knowledge expands. Skill gaps could arise as a consequence of poor education infrastructures, even in the efficient solution; in such circumstances, we find that whilst education policies are able to encourage growth, R&D policies are not. Otherwise, subsidizing education becomes ineffective for enhancing growth, although it could be necessary to avoid possible skill gaps originated by the R&D growth-enhancing policy.JEL Classification: O41, O33The authors wish to thank the financial support received for the project SEC 2001-2469 (Ministry of Science and Technology, Spain, and FEDER), as well as the comments of the co-editor and the referees.