BRETTON WOODS II STILL DEFINES THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

Abstract.  In this paper we argue that net capital inflows to the USA did not cause the financial crisis that now engulfs the world economy. A crisis caused by such flows has been widely predicted but that crisis has not occurred. Indeed, the international monetary system still operates in the way described by the Bretton Woods II framework and is likely to continue to do so. Failure to properly identify the causes of the current crisis risks a rise in protectionism that could intensify and prolong the decline in economic activity around the world.     

Will Sub-Prime be a Twin Crisis for the United States?

We identify incentives generated by the Bretton Woods II system that may have contributed to the sub-prime liquidity crisis now working its way through the international monetary system. We then evaluate the persistent conjecture that the liquidity crisis is or will become a balance of payments crisis for the United States. Given that it happens, the additional costs associated with a sudden stop of net capital flows to the United States could be quite substantial. But we observe that emerging market governments have continued to acquire US assets even as yields have fallen, and the incentives for continuing to do so remain strong. Moreover, the Bretton Woods II system, which has clearly been the most resilient of the forces driving current markets, continues to generate low real interest rates in industrial countries and growth in emerging markets that will help limit the damage from the liquidity crisis.     

以美元为中心的国际货币体系难以发生根本改变

大量流入的国外资本确实可能给美国带来灾难,但不是本次金融危机的直接元凶,而且也是本次金融危机的间接原因。布雷顿森林体系Ⅱ框架下以美元为中心的国际货币体系仍在发挥作用,现行国际货币体系甚至会因为本次金融危机而得到进一步巩固。我们必须正确认识本次金融危机产生的根本原因,否则会引发贸易摩擦,使得贸易保护主义风险抬头,并延长全球经济衰退的历程。     

Interest rates, exchange rates and international adjustment: BW II dynamics

Recent attempts to explain the dynamics of adjustment of dollar exchange rates in the face of an anticipated deterioration of the US net international investment position have focused on portfolio balance models of exchange rate determination. In this paper we argue that such models are useful in understanding the behavior of dollar exchange rates with emerging market currencies but, consistent with a large body of empirical research, are not useful in understanding changes in the dollars value against the euro or the currencies of other developed countries. We conclude that portfolio preferences of governments of emerging markets provide the most plausible explanation for the persistent US current account deficit.