Endogenous public sector budgeting: to centralize or not?

In this paper the impact of budget size on a government's choice to centralize or decentralize the budgetary process is investigated using asymmetric information, differing preferences, and endogenous budgetary arrangements. The central government chooses between a budgetary process that excludes the regional board (centralization) and one that includes the board (decentralization) in the determination of program budget levels. It is predicted that the central government will decentralize the budgetary process at low and centralize at high overall budget levels. Switching from decentralization to centralization is predicted to result in a reduction in the budget allocated to the regional board. JEL Classification: H3, C7 Processus budgétaire endogène dans le secteur public: faut‐il centraliser ou non? Ce mémoire analyse l'impact de la taille du budget sur le choix par un gouvernement de centraliser ou non son processus budgétaire. On met en évidence l'information asymétrique, les préférences différentes, et les arrangements budgétaires endogènes. Le gouvernement central choisit entre un processus budgétaire qui exclut le conseil régional (centralisation) et un autre qui l'inclut (décentralisation) dans la détermination des niveaux de budgets pour les programmes. On montre que le gouvernement central va décentraliser le processus budgétaire quand les niveaux de budget sont bas, et centraliser à des niveaux de budget plus élevés. Un déplacement de la décentralisation vers la centralisation résulte en une réduction du budget alloué au conseil régional.     

Public sector wage settlement and the threat of outsourcing

This paper investigates the impact of outsourcing on wage settlement in the public sector. The study characterizes the equilibrium wage offered by the public sector union to a government bureau competing against private sector firms. It is predicted that the union will offer a concession wage in an attempt to block outsourcing when its members' outside employment options are sufficiently unattractive and will offer a non-concession wage otherwise. The study contributes to the literature on outsourcing and wage determination in the public sector.     

Renting Goodwill in International Marketing Channels: An Analysis of Pricing Strategies and Bargaining Power

This paper investigates the pricing decisions of foreign manufacturers in international markets within a bargaining framework with asymmetric information and the rental of goodwill. The key findings are: first, the foreign manufacturer follows a mark-up pricing strategy in which its gross margin and the quality premium over the domestic product are shared with the importer. Second, a manufacturer–importer contract occurs only when the manufacturer’s bargaining power is within an admissible range which shrinks as transaction costs increase. Third, the domestic consumer will only purchase the foreign product if the importer’s goodwill in the domestic market is sufficiently large to signal quality. The paper contributes to the literature on exchange relationships between foreign manufacturers and importers.     

Editorial

Atlantic Economic Journal -     

Government Funding Policy Towards Communicable Diseases

The paper investigates the choice of government to offer a grant to a potential entrant aimed at reducing its fixed cost of entry when a monopoly firm provides the needed pharmaceutical drug given the prevalence path of the disease in a dynamic economic framework. The results of present study suggest that government can use a grant to credibly threaten the entry of a new firm into the industry and to promote limit-output pricing by the incumbent firm. The paper therefore suggests that the government policy set includes subsidizing the potential entry of a new firm into an industry manufacturing pharmaceutical drugs for the treatment of a communicable disease. Clearly, foreign aid could also be used as a source of this credible threat. The study also extends the paper by Mechoulan (2007) through the introduction of the government’s choice into the model.

Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country*

For their empirical evaluation, several active research programs in economics and political science require data on ethnic groups across countries. Ethnic group, however, is a slippery concept. After addressing conceptual and practical obstacles, I present a list of 822 ethnic groups in 160 countries that made up at least 1 percent of the country population in the early 1990s. I compare a measure of ethnic fractionalization based on this list with the most commonly used measure. I also construct an index of cultural fractionalization that uses the structural distance between languages as a proxy for the cultural distance between groups in a country.     

Economics of public good provision: auditing, outsourcing, and bribery

Abstract .  This study investigates a government's contracting decision to audit or outsource the provision of a public good given a potential hidden bribe and information asymmetries. The key findings are the following. First, the bribe and price of the public good are increasing in the corruptibility of the department. Second, the bribe is decreasing in the firm's bargaining power. Third, a bribery equilibrium exists when the department's corruptibility is sufficiently high given the firm's bargaining power. A bribe involves extortion or a compensatory payment depending on the department's corruptibility. Only a compensatory bribe affects the department's contracting decision.