What drives agrifood firms to register for an Environmental Management System?

This paper examines empirically which factors determine voluntaryadoption of Environmental Management System (EMS) certification(ISO 14001 or EMAS) by agrifood industries. A discrete-choicemodel of EMS certification is applied to a sample of 1,000 Frenchagrifood firms. The findings suggest that management-relatedfactors drive certification more strongly than economic incentivesand provides a new perspective on Porter's theory of the doublebenefit of certification.     

Communication externalities in cities

To identify communication externalities in French cities, we exploit a unique survey recording workplace communication of individual workers. Our hypothesis is that in larger and/or more educated cities, workers should communicate more. In turn, more communication should have a positive effect on wages. By estimating both an earnings and a communication equation, we find evidence of communication externalities. In larger and more educated cities, workers communicate more and in turn this has a positive effect on their wages. Depending on the estimates, we find that 13 to 22% of the effects of a more educated and larger city on wages percolate through this channel.     

Green not (only) for profit: An empirical examination of the effect of environmental-related standards on employees’ recruitment

Thanks to an original database on French firms we investigate the impact of environmental-related standards on employees’ recruitment. Using a bivariate probit model, we show that voluntary environmental-related standards (i.e., ISO 14001 standard, organic labeling, fair trade, etc.) improve the recruitment of professional and non-professional employees. This finding suggests that, beyond environmental considerations, human resources management can drive registration.     

Spatial wage disparities: Sorting matters!

Spatial wage disparities can result from spatial differences in the skill composition of the workforce, in non-human endowments, and in local interactions. To distinguish between these explanations, we estimate a model of wage determination across local labour markets using a very large panel of French workers. We control for worker characteristics, worker fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the characteristics of the local labour market. Our findings suggest that individual skills account for a large fraction of existing spatial wage disparities with strong evidence of spatial sorting by skills. Interaction effects are mostly driven by the local density of employment. Not controlling for worker heterogeneity leads to very biased estimates of interaction effects. Endowments only appear to play a small role.     

Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability

Evidence suggests that in developing countries, agents rely on mutual insurance agreements to deal with income or expenditure shocks. This paper analyzes which risk-sharing networks can be sustained in the long run when individuals are farsighted, in the sense that they are able to forecast how other agents would react to their choice of insurance partners. In particular, we study whether the farsightedness of the agents leads to a reduction of the tension between stability and efficiency that arises when individuals are myopic. We find that for extreme values of the cost of establishing a mutual insurance agreement, myopic and farsighted agents form the same risk-sharing networks. For small costs, farsighted agents form efficient networks while myopic agents don’t.     

What Drives the Responsiveness of the Budget Balance to the Business Cycle in EU Countries?

Intereconomics - The European Commission methodology for computing the cyclically adjusted government budget balance provides a robust measurement of the fiscal position of the Member States. The...