Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline

This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition between the buyers.     

Union games: technological unemployment

Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, C72. Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper.     

Does expenditure in public governance guarantee less corruption? Non-linearities and complementarities of the rule of law

Corruption is an endemic societal problem with profound implications in the development of nations. In combating this issue, cross-national evidence supporting the effectiveness of the rule of law seems at odds with poorly realized outcomes from reforms inspired in the academic literature. This paper provides an explanation for such contradiction. By building a computational approach, we develop three methodological novelties into the empirical study of corruption: (1) modeling government expenditure as a more adequate intervention variable than traditional indicators, (2) generating large within-country variation by means of bottom-up simulations (instead of cross-national data pooling), and (2) accounting for all possible interactions between covariates through a spillover network. Our estimates suggest that, the least developed a country is, the more difficult it is to find the right combination of policies that lead to reductions in corruption. We characterize this difficulty through a rugged landscape that governments navigate when changing the total budget size and the relative expenditure towards the rule of law. Importantly our method helps identifying the—country-specific—policy issues that complement the rule of law in the fight against corruption.

     

Differences Between Short‐ and Long‐Term Risk Aversion: An Optimal Asset Allocation Perspective

This paper studies the long‐term asset allocation problem of an investor with different risk aversion attitudes to the short and the long term. We characterize investor's preferences with a utility function exhibiting a regime shift in risk aversion at some point of the multiperiod investment horizon that is estimated using threshold nonlinearity methods. Our empirical results for a portfolio of cash, bonds and stocks suggest that long‐term risk aversion is higher than short‐term risk aversion and increases with the investment horizon. The exposure of the investment portfolio from stocks to bonds and cash increases with the degree of risk aversion.     

Sunkist Growers: Refreshing the Brand

The objective of this case is to introduce students to what is possibly the most complex agricultural cooperative in the United States and learn more about the economic issues involved in citrus production globally. Students are asked to analyze a strategy built around brand loyalty with higher costs and an inability to dictate to growers what varieties are most valuable to retailers.     

A legal and economic study of the new Consolidated Text of the Land Use Act of 2008 in Spain

The study conducts a legal and economic analysis comparing the new Consolidated Text of the Land Use Act of 2008 (Texto Refundido de la Ley de Suelo) and the Land Law 6/1998, April 13 now repealed. The study examines various articles contained in the new law and the old law. Although the study analyzes every title in both laws, it focuses on Title III regarding valuations for the expropriation of property owners.     

Precautionary Saving by Young Immigrants and Young Natives

This paper uses data from the 1979 Youth Cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLSY79) to explore the wealth accumulation patterns of younger cohorts as well as immigrants' and natives' precautionary saving in response to income uncertainty. We use two measures of wealth and construct a time-varying, conditional measure of income uncertainty, instead of relying on a constant, unconditional, summary measure of income uncertainty. We use a buffer-stock model of savings, and find that immigrants accumulate less wealth than do natives. Additionally, young natives' wealth accumulation patterns appear more responsive than those of their immigrant counterparts to income uncertainty.     

Optimal investment and production decisions and the value of the firm

We explore the effects of uncertainty on a firm that can respond by modifying its investment or production schedule (or both simultaneously) to variations in output price. Investment may increase capacity and/or reduce costs. We consider a firm with finite resources.Our model uses option theory instead of the more traditional net present value framework. One of the early papers using this approach is Brennan and Schwartz (1985) in which an investment project to extract a finite natural resource is valued. In that paper, the value of the firm is a function of two state variables, the finite resource to be extracted (output to be produced in the future) and the commodity spot price. In order to maximize firm value, the manager can respond by modifying one control variable, the production level. In our model we handle instead three state variables (spot price, resources, accumulated investment) and two control variables (production rate and investment rate), and solve numerically.We obtain both the value and the optimal policy of a firm that has investment projects that increase capacity and/or reduce costs and illustrate optimal policies as resources and available investments decrease over the life of the firm. Firms may start by only investing, then invest and produce, to end only producing.We thank Scott Wo, the referee and the editor for their comments and suggestions. Cortázar and Lowener acknowledge the financial support from FONDECYT and FONDER.     

Fiscal harmonization in the European Union with public inputs

Fiscal harmonization among the European Union member states is a goal involving major difficulties for its implementation. Each country faces a particular trade-off between fiscal revenues generated by taxation and the productive efficiency loss induced by their respective tax code. This paper provides a quantitative analysis of these trade-offs for a number of the European Union (EU-15) member states using a dynamic general equilibrium model with public inputs. Calibration of the model for the EU-15 member states provides the following results: i) the maximum tax revenue level is relatively far from the current tax levels for most countries; ii) the cases of Sweden, Denmark and Finland are anomalous, as productive efficiency can be gained by lowering tax rates without affecting fiscal revenues; iii) in general, countries would obtain efficiency gains without changing fiscal revenues by reducing the capital tax and increasing the labor tax; and iv) capital tax harmonization to the average capital tax rate can be done with quite small changes in both fiscal revenues and output for most countries.     

FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

The hypothesis that foreign direct investment into the United States responds to variations in exchange-rate levels and to exchange-rate uncertainty is tested for the period 1976-1998. We account for nonstationarity and cointegration in the data series and use conditional measures of exchange-rate uncertainty. While a long-run relationship exists among foreign direct investment in-flows as a share of GNP, the real exchange rate, and the GARCH measure of exchange-rate volatility, we find no discernible link between the real exchange rate and inward foreign direct investment in the short run. We also conclude that foreign direct investment decreases in response to increases in exchange-rate uncertainty in the short run when we use a conditional measure of exchange-rate uncertainty.