Bank panics and the endogeneity of central banking

Central banking is intimately related to liquidity provision to banks during times of crisis, the lender-of-last-resort function. This activity arose endogenously in certain banking systems. Depositors lack full information about the value of bank assets, so that during macroeconomic downturns they monitor their banks by withdrawing in a banking panic. The likelihood of panics depends on the industrial organization of the banking system. Banking systems with well-diversified big banks are less prone to inefficient bank runs because diversification alleviates the information asymmetry. In addition, big banks can self-monitor through publicly observable branch closure. Systems of many small banks form incentive-compatible bank coalitions to emulate the big banks during times of crisis. Such coalitions improve efficiency by monitoring member banks and issuing money that is a kind of deposit insurance—a precursor of central banking.     

The evolution of post-Soviet labour processes: a case study of the hollowing out of paternalism in Moldova

During the Soviet era, directors and workers derived mutual benefits from concealing true capacity, hoarding labour and just fulfilling an enterprise's plan. In an environment of labour shortages and guaranteed markets, managers used informal mechanisms to reward and retain good workers given the absence of unemployment and meaningful wage differentials as mechanisms to discipline workers. This cultivated a paternalistic set of relations between enterprise managers and workers, which, it is argued, are being hollowed out in the post-communist era. This is explored in a case study of evolving labour relations in Moldova. Casualization of the workforce has been used as a buffer against greater instability in both the supply of raw materials and demand. Such a strategy has become feasible as enterprises, such as the case-study firm, now have a large pool of external surplus labour on which they can draw. However, paternalism has not been hollowed out completely but rather a split-level realignment is identified.     

THE EVOLUTION OF COMPETITIVENESS IN HUNGARIAN AGRICULTURE: FROM TRANSITION TO ACCESSION

MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies -     

The Subprime Panic*

Understanding the ongoing credit crisis or panic requires understanding the designs of a number of interlinked securities, special purpose vehicles, and derivatives, all related to subprime mortgages. I describe the relevant securities, derivatives, and vehicles to show: (1) how the chain of interlinked securities was sensitive to house prices; (2) how asymmetric information was created via complexity; (3) how the risk was spread in an opaque way; and (4) how trade in the ABX indices (linked to subprime bonds) allowed information to be aggregated and revealed. These details are at the heart of the origin of the Panic of 2007. The events of the panic are described.     

E-coli,Repo Madness,and the Financial Crisis

All bond prices plummeted (spreads rose) during the financial crisis, not just the prices of subprime-related bonds. These price declines were because of a banking panic in which institutional investors and firms refused to renew sale and repurchase agreements (repos)—short-term, collateralized, agreements that the U.S. Federal Reserve rightly used to count as money. Collateral for repos was, to a large extent, securitized bonds. Firms were forced to sell assets as a result of the banking panic, reducing all bond prices and creating losses. There is nothing mysterious or irrational about the panic. There were genuine fears about the locations of subprime risk concentrations among counterparties. This banking system (the “shadow” or “parallel” banking system)—repos based on securitization—is a genuine banking system, as large as the traditional, regulated banking system. It is of critical importance to the economy because it is the funding basis for the traditional banking system. Without it, traditional banks will not lend and credit will not be created.     

Variations in Farm Performance in Transitional Economies: Evidence from the Czech Republic1

This paper revisits the literature on farm restructuring in the CEECs by analysing the variations in farm performance in the Czech Republic a decade after the start of the transition process. It identifies seven clusters of farms that differ in their productivity and profitability usng data from 1998 and 1999. The analysis reveals that the vast majority of farms are unprofitable, and there is no strong evidence that individual farms perform better than corporate farms. In fact, there are large numbers of individual farms that are loss‐making on their agricultural activity with low factor productivity. Producer co‐operatives and limited liability companies suffer from debts inherited from the reform process. Future restructuring is likely to occur in all clusters rather than affecting just corporate farms.     

Comments on ‘The role of technological and market structure in regulatory reform’ by Ronald R. Braeutigam

These comments were prepared for 1988 Conference on Perspectives on Banking Regulation held at the Cleveland Federal Bank, November 3 and 4, 1988.