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Motivated by examples from the automobile industry, insurance, retailing, and multinational strategy, we study an organizational structure we refer to as "partial delegation." In a bargaining problem between an informed party and an uninformed party, partial delegation involves the informed party delegating bargaining to an agent while retaining control of its private information. We show that partial delegation enables the informed party to earn information rents without creating quantity distortions. First‐best quantities are traded in equilibrium. We argue that partial delegation allows an informed party to implement efficient trade with outside parties by endogenously improving its bargaining power. 相似文献
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We study a duopoly game in which firms commit to a batch technology before competing in sales quantities. Adopting a batch technology requires the quantity produced to equal an integer number of batches and allows sales to be less than production. When larger batch sizes lower unit production costs (as in the U.S. airline industry with its economies of density), subgame perfect equilibrium sales quantities are unique and more competitive than the Cournot equilibrium quantities of a one‐shot game with continuous total cost functions. When larger batch sizes yield higher unit costs, equilibrium production can exceed equilibrium sales. 相似文献
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This paper derives welfare equivalence of double taxation rules in a tax competition model with discriminatory home taxes and the ability to finance subsidiary operations with host country capital. For a more general model, we provide sufficient conditions on the number of host sectors and factors that support double-tax-rule equivalence. Examples violating these conditions help identify economic factors under which a home country has strict preferences over double taxation rules. If the home tax rate can influence host factor prices, the home country weakly prefers deductions over credits as in the pure-home-equity financing case. 相似文献
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Summary. This paper derives the set of equilibria for common agency games in which the principals compete in piece rates and lump
sum payments and one principal has incomplete information about the agent's preferences. We show that the uninformed principal's
expected payoff function is discontinuous with respect to the identity of the marginal agent type. This discontinuity is shown
to support an open set of equilibria. For games in which the first-best equilibrium strategies are measurable with respect
to the uninformed principal's information partition, this result implies the existence of an open set of Pareto inefficient
equilibria.
Received: December 5, 1995; revised version August 18, 1996 相似文献
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Tax officials judge whether a multinational’s transfer price is consistent with the arm’s-length standard, the price at which
two independent firms would carry out a similar transaction, by using data from comparable but independent transactions. In
vertically integrated industries, the only source of comparable data may be from controlled (nonindependent) transactions.
Conventional wisdom asserts that standard arm’s-length methods cannot perform well in such markets because the comparability
rules encourage the integrated firms to collude tacitly on transfer prices in a way that amplifies tax-differential incentives.
In this paper, we show that strategic linkages between vertically integrated firms operating in the same final good market
moderate, and can possibly reverse, tax-differential incentives if the correct comparison method is used. The Cost-Plus method
turns out to be the most effective in limiting the equilibrium amount of profit-shifting out of the high-tax country and it
yields the highest tax revenues for the high-tax country. These benefits are shown to strengthen when the firms have private
cost information.
相似文献
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Thomas A. Gresik 《European Economic Review》2010,54(1):133-149
In 2002, the European Commission recommended that member countries use formula apportionment procedures to tax multinational companies. This departure from the standard separate accounting (transfer pricing) approach is an attempt to reduce the costs and distortions associated with auditing transfer prices. Unfortunately, apportionment formulas create their own economic distortions and, contrary to popular belief, they do not eliminate distortions due to asymmetric information between the multinational and the national tax authorities. In this paper, I explicitly model the role of private information in two tax competition games: one in which tax liabilities are calculated under formula apportionment and one in which tax liabilities are calculated under separate accounting and transfer prices are audited. Switching to a formula apportionment system affects the after-tax profit of multinationals and the tax revenues paid by both domestic and foreign firms. The direction and magnitude of the changes depend on the accuracy of the auditing technology and non-monotonically on multinational costs. The switch will have different effects on the tax receipts from domestic and foreign firms. 相似文献
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