Involuntary unemployment and inventories: An exploratory model of equilibrium and pure competition

We build up a model where the combination of labor supervision costs and non-uniform tastes results in a perfect-foresight equilibrium with positive involuntary unemployment and inventories even when prices and wages are assumed to be perfectly flexible. We show that the model could explain a positive association between the real wage and the level of employment (contrary to the standard post-Keynesian model), and a negative one between inventories and employment.     

Testing Gibrat’s Law for Small, Young and Innovating Firms

This article analyses whether small, young, and innovating firms have experienced a greater employment growth than other Spanish firms over the period 1990–2000. The study draws upon a sample of 1272 manufacturing firms in which only 967 of the firms survived for the entire ten year period. The analyses test Gibrat’s law, both by least squares and by utilizing the procedure proposed by Heckman in which a probit survival equation is first estimated to correct for sample selection bias. Two estimators correcting for selection bias are utilized: one that incorporates the inverse Mill’s ratio and the other that employs maximum likelihood methods. All the results reject Gibrat’s law and support the proposition that small firms have grown larger. Additionally, the results show that old firms grow less than young ones, and innovating activity – both process and product – is a strong positive factor in the firm’s survival and its employment growth.     

可靠性维修的管理系统(续)

五、技术状态的计算估计成套装置和已经安装的设备的技术状态所使用的算法,其定义和制定这个项目的众多主要目标之一。对各种型号设备的技术状态是分别计算的,并用两个指标中的一个指标来表示,一个是在考虑周期内的失效概率（正常情况以一年为一个周期）,另一个是残余寿命或预期寿命。技术状态用数值表示,数值小,说明设备处于完好状态,失效概率小和预期寿命长;数值大,则说明在考虑周期内失效概率大或它的预期寿命即将终止。     

Financial crises and liquidity shocks a bank-run perspective

In contrast with the financial multiplier literature, this note explores a case in which the shock triggering a financial crisis stems from the financial sector itself; it is not a shock stemming from the real sector which gets amplified by, say, agency problems. The basic intuition is provided by the bank-run literature of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) variety. Financial development is modeled as a mechanism that endows real assets (e.g., land and capital) with liquidity. However, liquidity can be impaired by shocks that are equivalent to a bank run. Liquidity creation enhances real asset prices, while a liquidity crunch generates asset price collapse. This bubble-looking episode is not driven by standard fundamentals, although it is fully in line with rationality. In this context, devoid of other frictions like price stickiness, the note examines the effect of monetary policy in the absence of nominal rigidities. It shows that preventing price deflation is not enough to offset relative (to output) asset price meltdown, but lower policy interest rates increase relative asset prices and steady-state output. Moreover, in the neighborhood of a first-best capital allocation, an increase in the liquidity of capital may lower the welfare of the representative individual, even if the higher liquidity of capital is sustainable and, hence, not destroyed by future crash – illustrating the possibility of “excessive” financial innovation. An extension of the basic model supports the conjecture that low policy interest rates may have given further incentives to the development of “shadow banking.”