The Marshallian macroeconomic model: A progress report

In this progress report, we first indicate the origins and early development of the Marshallian macroeconomic model (MMM) and briefly review some of our past empirical forecasting experiments with the model. Then we present recently developed one-sector, two-sector and n-sector models of an economy that can be employed to explain past experience, predict future outcomes and analyze policy problems. The results of simulation experiments with various versions of the model are provided to illustrate some of its dynamic properties that include “chaotic” features. Last, we present comments on planned future work with the model.     

Inter-enterprise arrears in economies in transition

In the context of economies in transition, the paper argues that an excessive liquidity squeeze could throw the economy into a persistent state of low economic activity. In such bad equilibrium, enterprise transactions become largely demonetized, with a chain of arrears, a form of involuntary credit, spreading over the entire system. The empirical analysis of the Romanian experience seems to support the view advanced in the paper.     

Deriving benefits from conflict resolution: A macrojustice assessment

Effective conflict resolution procedures serve to minimize dysfunctional effects of conflict and maximize functional effects. In the literature on conflict resolution procedures, the effectiveness of procedures has been evaluated primarily from the perspective of the individual. This article suggests that a system-level analysis of the pattern of outcomes resulting from different conflict resolution procedures is a necessary component in formulating a comprehensive framework for the design and evaluation of conflict resolution systems in organizations. The analytic questions addressed by this study concern associations between resolution procedures and outcome patterns in a system created specifically for conflict resolution within organizations: the grievance system. The pattern of outcomes was found to vary with the conflict resolution procedure. It is suggested that this has important implications for effective conflict resolution systems.     

Racing in two dimensions

In this paper we study an industry in which there is an ongoing sequence of R&D races between two firms. Firms are engaged in product innovation. Products are horizontally and vertically differentiated. There are two key characteristics/dimensions to products, and the level at which these are embodied in products can be increased by R&D. At each time firms can spend R&D on improving their product in one or both dimensions. We allow the possibility of economies scope — so R&D undertaken in one dimension can spillover to the other. The question we are interested in is whether a firm that is ahead in a single dimension but behind in another will focus all its R&D effort in the area in which it is ahead (product specialisation), or whether it will try to do R&D in both dimensions in the hope that it might get ahead in both and end up with a superproduct that dominates in both characteristics. The outcome of this R&D competition determines a Markov transition probability matrix determining the evolution of the industry. We show that when the R&D technology is characterized by constant returns then the only steady-state outcome is one in which the economy stays forever in a position in which one firm produces a super-product and the other gives up doing R&D altogether. This outcome is unaffected by the degree of economies of scope. When the R&D technology is characterised by decreasing returns, then the industry will visit all states and so will exhibit both product specialisation and superproduct dominance at various times. Now the extent of economies of scope matters and we show that the greater the extent of economies of scope, the less likely is the industry to exhibit product dominance, and the more likely it is to exhibit product specialisation.     

The “Iron Law of Paternalism” in Employee Grievances and Arbitration? A Comparison of Disciplinary and Nondisciplinary Cases

In the criminology literature, the iron law of paternalism suggests that women receive less serious sanctions in the judicial system. This examination of three years of grievance outcomes (n= 1216) and arbitration outcomes (n= 1146) tests this iron law in the context of organizational disciplinary and dispute resolutions. These data, across several levels of outcomes (win, lose, compromise), controlling for the severity of grievances (disciplinary/nondisciplinary) and arbitrations (termination/nontermination) provide no support for the paternalistic thesis. Moreover, we find no support for the paternalistic thesis with regard to either the incidence or length of suspensions as a function of gender.     

可靠性维修的管理系统(续)

五、技术状态的计算 估计成套装置和已经安装的设备的技术状态所使用的算法，其定义和制定这个项目的众多主要目标之一。对各种型号设备的技术状态是分别计算的，并用两个指标中的一个指标来表示，一个是在考虑周期内的失效概率（正常情况以一年为一个周期），另一个是残余寿命或预期寿命。技术状态用数值表示，数值小，说明设备处于完好状态，失效概率小和预期寿命长；数值大，则说明在考虑周期内失效概率大或它的预期寿命即将终止。     

Can teaching social dilemmas make people more prosocial? An experiment

Economics and business students regularly behave less prosocially than others. Can ethics training reverse this tendency? Results from a repeated public goods experiment reveal that it can. Students who attend an interactive lecture on social dilemmas show significantly more cooperation than others. However, the lecture does not appear to increase the incidence of reciprocal behavior. As many current social problems qualify as social dilemmas, this result stresses the importance of ethics training for policy makers and curriculum designers alike in overcoming the incentive structure of social dilemmas.     

Search and Wholesale Price Discrimination

Firms often choose not to post prices in wholesale markets, and buyers must incur costs to discover prices. Inspired by evidence of customized pricing (e.g., some customers pay up to 70% more than others) and search costs, I estimate a search model to study how personalized pricing impacts efficiency in a wholesale market. I find that price discrimination decreases total surplus by 11.6% and increases the sellers' profits by up to 52.1%. These effects are partially explained by price discrimination softening competition through a decrease in search incentives, illustrating how price discrimination may magnify the efficiency costs of search frictions.