TESTING FOR INVERSE HOMOTHETICITY: A NONPARAMETRIC APPROACH

The efficiency of a decision-making unit can be estimated relative to the direct output possibility set or the indirect (cost-constrained) output possibility set. For the direct and indirect output sets we show that the ratio of two Farrell (radial) efficiency measures equals the ratio of two Zieschang (non-radial) efficiency measures if and only if the production technology is inverse-homothetic. A consequence of inverse homotheticity is that the input and output expansion paths are linear.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING FOR TRADE LIBERALIZATION: POLITICS OF AGRICULTURE RELATED GOVERNMENT SPENDING FOR THE URUGUAY ROUND IN JAPAN

This paper investigates the effect of political factors on the interregional allocation of the budget to assist farmers in coping with agricultural trade liberalization in Japan. We present a simple model to show the relationship between political factors and interregional budget allocation and empirically examine whether political factors played a key role in the interregional allocation of Japanese government spending for the Uruguay Round agricultural trade liberalization. Our findings show that this allocation was distorted due to political reasons, which was problematic from the standpoints of fairness and social efficiency.     

The Repository of Soft Information within Bank Organizations

We examine who is the repository of soft information within bank organizations. Inconsistent with the conventional view of loan officers as the sole repository, we find that branch managers have the most soft information. We also find the repository at a higher hierarchical level at smaller banks. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that branch managers themselves actively collect soft information, especially at smaller banks. These findings suggest the need for a more nuanced view beyond the conventional emphasis on loan officers, and call for studies on the equilibrium design of the collection, processing, and use of soft information within bank organizations.     

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS AND PUBLIC DEBT POLICY*

We consider how the second‐best allocation corresponding to an optimal rule under the policy commitment of a central bank and a fiscal authority with a consolidated government budget constraint can be achieved, even though these authorities are unable to commit themselves to their optimal policies and ignore the strategic interaction between their policies. Our results show that the best practical institutional arrangement is to have an instrument‐independent central bank that controls the money supply to determine the rate of inflation and commits itself to an inflation target that depends on fiscal variables.