Common Risk Factors Versus a Mispricing Factor of Tokyo Stock Exchange Firms: Inquiries into the Fundamental Value Derived from Analyst Earnings Forecasts*

We search for common factors and/or a mispricing factor for Tokyo Stock Exchange firms. We utilize the Edwards–Bell–Ohlson model to compute the firms' fundamental value and divide this value by the firms' market price to construct a new variable called a ‘value‐to‐price ratio’ (VPR). We find that this VPR variable can generate abnormal returns even after adjusting for the risk factors related to portfolio style differences. To find out whether it is indeed a risk factor or simply a characteristic, we construct return difference portfolios of the high VPR stocks minus the low value‐to‐price stocks and call this portfolio the upward‐forecast minus downward‐forecast (UMD) factor. Fama and MacBeth test indicate that the risk premium for this UMD factor is positive. The best model in terms of the adjusted R² value is the four‐factor model in which the UMD factor is added to the Fama and French three factors. GMM Euler condition tests reveal that the UMD factor helps to price assets and that the four‐factor model is not rejected. We conclude the VPR variable contains new information content that is not contained in the conventional Fama and French's three factors.     

Monitoring and Forecasting Currency Crises

Can we improve forecasts of currency crises by using a large number of predictors? Which predictors should we use? This paper evaluates the performance of traditional leading indicators and a new Diffusion Index (DI) method as Early Warning Systems to monitor the risk and forecast the likelihood of the recent currency crises in East Asia. We find that the DI performs quite well in real time. For most countries, the forecasted probabilities of a crisis increase substantially around the actual time of the crisis. The economic variables that help in forecasting future crises are output growth, interest rates and money growth.     

Heterogeneous Consumers and Fiscal Policy Shocks

This paper studies empirical facts regarding the effects of unexpected changes in aggregate macroeconomic fiscal policies on consumers that differ depending on individual characteristics. We use data from the Consumption Expenditure Survey to estimate individual‐level responses and multipliers for government spending. We find that unexpected fiscal shocks have substantially different effects on consumers depending on their income and age levels: the wealthiest individuals tend to behave according to predictions of standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) models, whereas the poorest ones behave according to standard IS–LM (non‐Ricardian) models, most likely due to credit constraints. Furthermore, government spending policy shocks tend to decrease consumption inequality.     

FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH SMALL FINES: THE PENANCE CONTRACT*

This paper investigates finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games with explicit contractual devices. It shows that full collusion can be achieved in a unique manner by incentivizing the players' final‐period play with small fines. The incentivizing modality is the penance contract, by which a player is penalized if and only if he deviates from the penance strategy in the final period. Using this contractual agreement brings the penance strategy profile into unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the entire game and achieves full collusion without being invalidated by renegotiation.     

CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS AND THE FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR CAUSED BY BANK CAPITAL

This paper develops a computable dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks, a portion of which may be constrained by capital adequacy requirements and the remainder of which may not, in order to examine what effects the capital requirements and bank capital induce in the macroeconomy. Applying the parameterized expectations algorithm, the model economy shows that binding bank capital constraints induce the financial accelerator, the hump‐shaped dynamic behaviour of output, and ineffectuality of monetary policy, and that all the results are derived from the individual banks’ cross‐sectional asymmetric responses that are consistent with the empirical evidence.     

ON DETAIL‐FREE MECHANISM DESIGN AND RATIONALITY*

Mechanism design theory has been criticized, because mechanisms depend on the detail of specification and agents’ behaviour relies on strong rationality assumptions. Hence the study of “detail‐free” mechanism design with weak rationality is important as a practical theory. This paper emphasizes that, even if we confine our attention to detail‐free mechanisms with weak rationality, there exists plenty of scope for the development of new and significant ideas. I describe my recent work along these lines, and argue that stochastic decisions work in large double auction environments, and that moral preferences improve the implementability of social choice functions.     

MEAN‐PLUS‐NOISE FACTOR MODELS: AN EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION

In this paper I propose an alternative factor model whose common factor follows a mean‐plus‐noise process. While the existing methods for factor models should be valid for this model, their performance may be misleading in small samples. Because the likelihood function of this model is not tractable, I estimate this model by Bayesian methods. When applied to US macroeconomic time series, we find that the estimated mean‐plus‐noise factor is useful for predicting real personal income, industrial production and unemployment at long prediction horizons.     

ROLE OF RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS IN INTERGROUP COMPETITION

We investigate the moral hazard problem in which a principal delegates multiple tasks to multiple workers. The principal imperfectly monitors their action choices by observing the public signals that are correlated with each other through a macro shock. He divides the workers into two groups and makes them compete with each other. We show that when the number of tasks is sufficiently large, relative performance evaluation between the groups accompanied by absolute performance evaluation results in eliminating unwanted equilibria. In this case, any approximate Nash equilibrium nearly induces the first‐best allocation.     

OPTIMAL FOREIGN BORROWING REVISITED

Foreign capital has become increasingly important in financing investment and growth in developing countries. Foreign capital flows, however, can be volatile as is evident from the recent financial crises. It has also recently been noted by researchers that there is little systematic empirical evidence that foreign capital contributes to the economic growth of developing countries. In this context, this paper attempts to theoretically reevaluate the borrowing behaviour of a developing economy that relies on foreign borrowing for its capital formation. In particular, this paper investigates the implications of different lending policies of international financial institutions. It is found that no matter whether the borrowing interest rate increases with the level of foreign debt per capita or with the foreign‐capital/total‐capital ratio, the economy always moves toward the stationary state. The result holds even when the representative agent regards the interest rate given as constant. This implies that foreign borrowing does help economic growth, irrespective of lending policies of international financial institutions.