Regulation through a revenue contest

This paper proposes a mechanism for the regulation of duopolies a revenue contests among the firms. Under the mechanism, the firm with the lower revenue is to pay a penalty to the firm with the higher revenue proportional to the difference between their revenues. In a homogenous good Cournot duopoly with convex cost and demand functions, the mechanism implements the optimal outcome when the firms have symmetric costs. When one firm is more efficient, the mechanism leads to increased social surplus under a large set of parameters. We also consider extensions that involve cost uncertainty, repeated games and differentiated goods.     

An exercise in political economy of tax reform

If the tax rate is endogenously determined by majority voting, then a fully effective and costless reform resulting in full tax compliance may not be supported by a majority even when the evaders (or, avoiders) are only a minority.     

Accurate estimation of expected coverage: revisited

As noted in several studies (Batta et al., Transp. Sci. 23 (1989) 277), (Burwell et al., Comput. Opns. Res. 20 (1993) 113), (Daskin, Network and Discrete Location, Wiley, New York, 1995), (Marianov and ReVelle, Eur. J. Opns. Res. 93 (1996) 110), (Saydam et al., Socio-Econ. Plann. Sci. 28(2) (1994) 113), the accurate estimation of expected coverage is an important and open issue. Although the maximum expected coverage model is empirically shown to prescribe a robust set of “optimal” locations, earlier findings suggest that it could also over or underestimate the coverage by a significant margin. In this study, we present a genetic algorithm (GA) that combines the expected coverage approach with the hypercube model (Jarvis, Mgmt. Sci. 31 (1985) 235), (Larson, Comput. Opns. Res. 1 (1974) 67), (Larson, Opns. Res. 23 (1975) 845) to solve the maximum expected coverage location problem with increased accuracy and realism. Our findings suggest that the GA provides at least as good solutions 94% of the time making it a viable alternative to the two-step procedures stipulated earlier.