Entry deterrence and innovation in durable-goods monopoly

This paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable-goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well. We show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good. The equilibrium is therefore determined not only by the incentive for intertemporal price discrimination in durable-goods monopoly, but also by the incumbent's concern for maintaining the technological leadership. We demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation.     

Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications

We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D.     

Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence

In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to Hart and Moore?s (2008) recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points.     

The role of lifetime activity cues in customer base analysis

This paper develops the notion of lifetime activity cues in customer base analysis. The authors first discuss the impact of lifetime indicators, such as customers' conceptual response to marketing activities, and then demonstrate how such lifetime cues can be embedded into the Pareto/NBD model. The authors theoretically analyze the implication of this additional behavioral indication on the model's predictions. In an illustrative example, they aim to establish an intuitive understanding of the effects of such information. Evidence from the cellular phone industry supports the relevance of this concept: The empirical study finds a substantial improvement in predictive accuracy in two independent holdout samples. The study concludes with a discussion of the managerial relevance of the proposed approach and opportunities for further research.     

Distributed Visual Language Environments for Cooperation and Learning: Applications and Intelligent Support

An increasing number of collaborative learning environments is based on shared workspace systems using two-dimensional graph-structured visual representations such as argumentation networks and concept maps. We propose an integrated framework that allows for flexibly specifying a wide range of visual languages and plugging in components for operational semantics, adequate feedback and intelligent support. The generic application CardBoard provides card-based user interaction and collaboration by means of different languages in shared workspaces. To enhance modifiability, the interfaces between the distributed heterogeneous system components, particularly between intelligent components and user interfaces, have been standardised.