Uncertainty, Commitment, and Optimal Taxation

This paper examines the optimal tax design problem in the presence of wage uncertainty. The wage has a continuous distribution, individuals are ex ante identical, preferences are separable in labor supply and goods, public policy aims at providing the population with social insurance, and the only restriction on the tax instruments is that emanating from lack of public observability of realized wages and labor supplies. We show that optimal tax structures depend crucially on whether it is labor supply or goods that consumers have to commit to before the resolution of uncertainty. Specifically, we prove that, in the absence of commitment, the social insurance problem collapses to the traditional optimal tax problem. Second, if labor supply is precommitted, it would be possible to effect a first-best outcome. Third, commitment to goods would make indirect taxation a useful instrument of tax policy even in the presence of a general income tax; it requires differential tax treatment of committed and noncommitted goods. Finally, if preferences are separable between the two types of goods, precommitted goods must be taxed at a uniform rate lower than that on the noncommitted goods.     

When new product development fails in China: mediating effects of voice behaviour and learning from failure

This paper investigates conflicts following a new product development (NPD) failure. Conducted in a Chinese business setting, the study examines whether voice behaviour and learning from failure mediate the relationship between task- and emotional conflict emerging from NPD failure. Our findings indicate that voice behaviour and learning from failure are necessary to effectively reduce task and emotional conflict and thus to enhance future NPD. Specifically, it is revealed that emotional conflict leads to a reduced level; and that voice behaviour and learning from failure are significant mediators that influences the relationships between emotional and task conflicts with it.     

Deployment of Indonesian migrants in the Middle East: present situation and prospects

"This paper examines the Indonesian overseas employment program. It is limited to overseas deployment through the official channels, i.e. organised by licensed labour suppliers and approved by government authorities. The main destination of this official labour migration is the Middle East. Indonesian officials have indicated that the government aims to increase overseas employment and to shift deployment from houseworkers to better skilled workers. It is argued in the paper that, in view of a shrinking labour market for migrants, even limited realisation of these hopes would depend upon some distinct changes in the overseas employment program."     

Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Common Network Externalities

We study competition in two-sided markets with a common network externality rather those than with the standard inter-group effects. This type of externality occurs when both groups benefit, possibly with different intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satisfies a homogeneity condition then platforms’ profits and price structures have some specific properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to the other, according to the homogeneity degree. Prices are affected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers. In the specific but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platforms’ profits do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This result differs from those of the two-sided models, which deal with standard positive inter-group network externality.