Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria with inferential expectations

We incorporate inferential expectations into the Barro-Gordon model (Barro and Gordon, 1983a) of time inconsistency and consider reputational equilibria. The range of sustainable equilibria shrinks as the private sector becomes more belief-conservative.     

Wann lohnt sich die Beschaffung zusätzlicher Informationen? Darstellung des Entscheidungsproblems und der Ermittlung des Wertes von Informationen am Beispiel des Kalküls einer Versicherung

Insurance companies decide on refusal or acceptance (and in this case: the conditions) of a potential policyholder. This paper deals with the question whether the use of genetic testing is advantageous or not. Insurance companies have to consider costs and benefits of the additional information gained by genetic testing. The science of economics, in particular decision theory, helps investigating how insurance companies are able to optimize their outcomes. This paper deals with relevant basics of decision theory and solves the problem by making use of Jakob Marschak’s approach of information economics. The value of additional information attainable from genetic testing is calculated and integrated in the decision process of an insurance company. In doing so, the model is applied to the hemochromatosis disease. Nevertheless, the model is demonstrated in a general manner. It should be easy to adapt the approach to other illness syndromes, medical checkups or medical decision problems.     

Belief adjustment: a double hurdle model and experimental evidence

Experimental Economics - We present an experiment where subjects sequentially receive signals about the true state of the world and need to form beliefs about which one is true, with payoffs...