Corrigendum to “Characterization of the asymptotic distribution of semiparametric M-estimators” [J. Econometrics 159 (2) (2010) 252–266]

This note provides correction to Ichimura and Lee (2010).     

The Spatial Distribution of Japanese Manufacturing Industries in Indonesia

This paper presents an analysis of regional changes in the spatial pattern of Japanese manufacturing industries and the effect of deregulation of foreign investment in Indonesia during 1984–1994. Empirical analysis in this paper uses data of 560 Japanese manufacturing industries in Indonesia. The result of this study indicates their continuous regional concentration in the core region of Java. The regression analysis indicates that market, agglomeration and infrastructure continue to be the main reasons for the location of Japanese manufacturing industries. The current economic crisis has substantially reduced the level of new investment in the core region of Java.     

Portfolio optimization using dynamic factor and stochastic volatility: evidence on Fat‐tailed errors and leverage

The portfolio optimization problem is investigated using a multivariate stochastic volatility model with factor dynamics, fat‐tailed errors and leverage effects. The efficient Markov chain Monte Carlo method is used to estimate model parameters, and the Rao–Blackwellized auxiliary particle filter is used to compute the likelihood and to predict conditional means and covariances. The proposed models are applied to sector indices of the Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX), which consists of 33 stock market indices classified by industrial sectors. The portfolio is dynamically optimized under several expected utilities and two additional static strategies are considered as benchmarks. An extensive empirical study indicates that our proposed dynamic factor model with leverage or fat‐tailed errors significantly improves the predictions of the conditional mean and covariances, as well as various measures of portfolio performance.     

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES: CHINA AND INDONESIA COMPARED

China's and Indonesia's development strategies have been compared with others, but rarely with each other. Radically different political contexts have produced both similar and distinctly different development patterns. Each using formal planning, Indonesia spurred radical reforms to promote growth, whereas China opted for incremental reforms to ‘grow out of the Plan’, as a political device and to discover what policies and institutions worked. Both strategies produced environments largely conducive to rapid development. Indonesia relied on a few economic technocrats to oversee development; China used decentralisation and party reforms to create a credible environment for non-state investment. Both shared concern for agricultural reform and food security; both opted to open up for trade—China gradually, Indonesia radically. Both did well in growth and poverty reduction following reform. China's growth performance is in a league of its own, especially since Indonesia's Asian crisis setback, but Indonesia had more equitable growth and survived a difficult political transition with, in hindsight, modest costs.     

Existence of a continuum of equilibria in a monetary random-matching model

In this paper, we study a monetary random-matching model where both goods and money are perfectly divisible, production is costly, and there is no exogenous upper bound on agents' money holdings, information on which is private to the agent. We show that there is a continuum of stationary equilibria where agents have either no money or a set amount, and buyers spend all their money. As in the previous studies, the equilibrium value function is step-like, which emerges as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The endogenous upper bound on agents' money holdings is the result of private information on agents' money holdings. Buyers post an offer that is accepted only by sellers without money, who set a higher value on money.     

Matching As An Econometric Evaluation Estimator

This paper develops the method of matching as an econometric evaluation estimator. A rigorous distribution theory for kernel-based matching is presented. The method of matching is extended to more general conditions than the ones assumed in the statistical literature on the topic. We focus on the method of propensity score matching and show that it is not necessarily better, in the sense of reducing the variance of the resulting estimator, to use the propensity score method even if propensity score is known. We extend the statistical literature on the propensity score by considering the case when it is estimated both parametrically and nonparametrically. We examine the benefits of separability and exclusion restrictions in improving the efficiency of the estimator. Our methods also apply to the econometric selection bias estimator.     

Role of Information Rents in Relational Contracts

We study a repeated contracting model in which the agent has private information and the performance measure is unverifiable. In an optimal stationary contract, when the discount factor is not high, the principal's objective shifts from purely reducing the information rent toward increasing the total surplus to sustain the relational contract. As a result, the total surplus is not monotonically increasing in the discount factor and could decrease when the unverifiable performance measure becomes verifiable.     

Identification of Dynamic Models of Rewards Programme

“Frequent‐buyer” rewards programmes are commonly used by companies as a marketing tool to compete for market share. They provide a unique environment for studying consumers’ forward‐looking behaviour. The consumer's problem on accumulating reward points can be formulated as a stationary infinite horizon discrete choice dynamic programming model. We show that the parameters of this model, including the discount factor, are well‐identified. In particular, it is possible to identify state‐dependent discount factors (i.e. discount factors can vary with the number of reward points). We discuss how this identification result is related to the goal‐gradient hypothesis studied in the consumer psychology literature.     

Relational contracting and endogenous formation of teamwork

We study a relational contracting model with two agents where each agent faces multiple tasks: effort toward the agent's own project and helping effort toward another agent's project. We show that the optimal task structure is either specialization without help or teamwork with a substantial amount of help: teamwork with a small amount of help is never optimal. Specialization with high‐powered incentives can be implemented by relative performance evaluation. However, under teamwork, the evaluation scheme must be substantially different to overcome the multitasking problem. Consequently, a small amount of help is dominated by specialization with high powered incentives.