Transboundary Environmental Problems with Mobile but Heterogeneous Populations

Most of the literature on transboundaryenvironmental problems treats population ineach country or region as constant, ignoringpopulation mobility. We showed previously thatif there is perfect population mobility betweenregions, and populations are homogeneous, asocially efficient outcome can be supported asa Nash equilibrium of the game of uncoordinatedpolicy setting, even without any internationalenvironmental agreement. In the present paperwe introduce heterogeneous population, and showthat when people differ, a non-cooperativeoutcome is generally inefficient. We alsodemonstrate that for a particular set ofobjective functions for the regionalgovernments, there is an equilibrium of thegame of uncoordinated policy setting that isefficient. Finally, we give an example wherethe decentralized outcome is efficient whenthere is no population mobility, butinefficient when there is population mobility.     

Emission Taxes versus Other Environmental Policies

In the environmental policy of most countries, various forms of quotas and direct regulation are more important than environmental taxes. This paper addresses four arguments which are often given against the use of emission taxes. The three arguments related to information asymmetries and non-convexities are valid in the sense that they point to complications in the use of environmental taxes. The fourth argument is related to the employment effects of different types of environmental policies in economies with unemployment. Although this argument is frequently used by politicians, the analysis provides no justification for it. On the contrary: in the model used, employment is higher with environmental taxes than with non-revenue-raising environmental policies.     

Efficiency wages and income taxes

The paper was written during a visit at the Ludwig-Maximilian-University of Munich in the summer of 1988. The hospitality of this institution, as well as the financial support from a Ruhrgas Scholarship under the West German Norwegian Scholarship Scheme, is gratefully acknowledged. Participants at various seminars have given useful comments and criticism. I am also grateful to two anonymous referees for their comments to an earlier version of the paper.     

Can highway investment policies influence regional growth?

If a highway investment policy instrument is to alter growth in the manner desired, two criteria must be satisfied: (1) the policy instrument must be implemented, and (2) the implementation must achieve the desired policy goal. A look at three decades of highway policy goals (slowing net population growth, reducing arterial congestion, and fostering city-specific population increases) and policy instruments (zoning and sewer restrictions, gridded networks, and highway facility construction or non-construction) provided insights regarding the extent to which Virginia's growth-oriented highway investment decisions satisfied these two criteria.Crucial to the first criterion is that a policy instrument will not be implemented if it lacks a supporting mechanism. For example, the policy instrument of gridded networks in this study lacked any ordinance, financial incentive, or training to facilitate its implementation. Crucial to the second criterion is that highway investments are not effective for achieving a growth-related policy goal. Development will continue in a region despite efforts to slow it by deleting new roads from master plans or will occur elsewhere despite efforts to target it in a specific area.     

On a property of the sequential t-test

Abstract

1. Introduction. In one of his papers [1], and later in his book on sequential analysis [2], Wald introduced a general method for constructing sequential tests of composite hypotheses and applied the method to construct a sequential t-test. Since Wald devoted a considerable amount of space and mathematics on his t-test, it has been taken for granted that he proved certain optimum properties of the test. It is the purpose of this note to show that the test cannot possess one of the properties thought to hold for it.     

Optimal harvest age considering multiple carbon pools – A comment

In two recent papers, Asante and Armstrong (2012) and Asante et al. (2011) considered the question of optimal harvest ages. They found that the larger are the initial pools of dead organic matter (DOM) and wood products, the shorter is the optimal rotation period. In this note, it is found that this conclusion follows from the fact that the authors ignored all release of carbon from decomposition of DOM and wood products after the time of the first harvest. When this is corrected for, the sizes of the initial stocks of DOM and wood products do not influence the optimal rotation period. Moreover, in contrast to the conclusions in the two mentioned papers, our numerical analysis indicates that inclusion of DOM in the model leads to longer, not shorter, rotation periods.     

International Cooperation on Climate-friendly Technologies

We examine international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on emission reductions. We show that without any R&D cooperation, R&D in each country should be increased beyond the non-cooperative level if (i) the technology level in one country is positively affected by R&D in other countries, (ii) the domestic carbon tax is lower than the Pigovian level, or (iii) the domestic carbon tax is set directly through an international tax agreement. We also show that a second-best technology agreement has higher R&D, higher emissions, or both compared with the first-best-outcome. The second-best subsidy always exceeds the subsidy under no international R&D cooperation. Further, when the price of carbon is the same in the second-best technology agreement and in the case without R&D cooperation, welfare is highest, R&D is highest and emissions are lowest in the second-best R&D agreement.     

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in the Health Sector when There is a Private Alternative to Public Treatment

In health economics, cost-effectiveness is defined as maximizedhealth benefits for a given health budget. When there is a privatealternative to public treatments, care must be taken when usingcost-effectiveness analysis to decide what types of treatmentsshould be included in the public program. The correct benefitmeasure is in this case the sum of health benefits to thosewho would not be treated without the public alternative andthe cost savings to those who would otherwise choose privatetreatment. In the socially optimal ranking of treatments tobe included in the public health program, treatments shouldbe given higher priority the higher are costs per treatmentfor a given ratio of gross heath benefits to costs. (JEL: H42,H51, I18)     

International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions

Several serious environmental problems have a global character. International cooperation to reduce emissions for this type of problems often takes the form of an agreement among the cooperating countries to cut back emissions by a uniform percent rate compared with some base year. This type of agreements has two disadvantages. In the first place, it is well known from environmental economics that equal percentage reductions of emissions from different sources usually gives an inefficient outcome, in the sense that the same environmental goals could be achieved at lower costs through a different distribution of emission reductions. A second problem with agreements of equal percentage reductions is that not all countries will find it in their interest to participate in such agreements. In the paper, it is assumed that the set of countries which participate in an agreement is endogenously determined, with a country participating in an agreement provided that this makes the country better off than it would have been in a situation without any agreement. The agreement among the participating countries is assumed to be a uniform percentage reduction of their emissions. The countries have different opinions about what this uniform percentage should be. In the paper, it is assumed that the outcome is determined by the median country of the participating countries. The assumptions above lead to a particular equilibrium, in which some but not all countries cooperate. The equilibrium reduction of emissions for the cooperating countries is also derived. This equilibrium compared with the first best optimum within the context of simple numerical example.Presented at the conference Environmental Cooperation and Policy in the Single European Market, Venice, April 16–20, 1990. The paper is part of the research project Energy and Society at the Centre for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF), Oslo. I am grateful to Ignazio Musu and Henk Folmer for useful comments on an earlier version of the paper.     

Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers between countries, as there is no instrument that (directly) corrects for these externalities. Without an international climate agreement, the (non-cooperative) equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon taxes as their environmental policy instruments. All countries are better-off in the tax case than in the quota case. Two types of international climate agreements are then studied: One is a Kyoto type of agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas. In the second type of agreement, a common carbon tax is used domestically in all countries. None of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum. Even if the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level, R&D investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the quota case. It is also argued that the quota agreement gives higher R&D expenditures and more abatement than the tax agreement.