HOW TO COMPLY WITH ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS? THE ROLE OF INFORMATION

The effectiveness of environmental regulation can be viewed as conditioned by the action of two main agents: regulated firms and public agency. Using a questionnaire on the pulp and paper industry in Portugal, this article finds that firms' decision to comply with environmental regulations is strongly influenced by firms' information on its legal obligations; this effect is stronger for smaller firms. Moreover larger/younger firms are less likely to comply with environmental regulations than smaller/older firms. Regarding the public agency's behavior, the authors find that greater monitoring efforts are directed toward larger/younger firms and toward those firms most likely to cause higher pollution levels. (JEL K32, Q28 )     

Beliefs and Public Good Provision with Anonymous Contributors

We analyze a static game of public good contributions where finitely many anonymous players have heterogeneous preferences about the public good and heterogeneous beliefs about the distribution of preferences. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, the only individuals who make positive contributions are those who most value the public good and who are also the most pessimistic; that is, according to their beliefs, the proportion of players who most like the public good is smaller than it would be according to any other possible belief. We predict whether the aggregate contribution is larger or smaller than it would be in an analogous game with complete information and heterogeneous preferences, by comparing the beliefs of contributors with the true distribution of preferences. A trade‐off between preferences and beliefs arises if there is no individual who simultaneously has the highest preference type and the most pessimistic belief. In this case, there is a symmetric equilibrium, and multiple symmetric equilibria occur only if there are more than two preference types.     

The Equity Accounting Saga in Australia: Cyclical Standard Setting

Equity accounting in Australia has had a long, chequered history. This article examines that history by reference to a succession of six Exposure Drafts, one Statement of Accounting Practice and two Standards issued between 1968 and 1995. We adapt Nobes' (1991, 1992a. 1992b) cycle model of regulation to explain variation in 'standardization' across these documents. Nobes defined 'standardization' to mean the restriction of choice in accounting methods but we modify the concept to allow for measurement rule 'improvements' and changes in required disclosure levels. Nobes' cycle model has four stages: a starting point of varied practice: energy inputs, often crises, drawing attention to the issue at hand: forces opposing and forces in favour of standardization. A cycle- like pattern of variation in standardization emerges in the present context. Potential shortcomings of the cycle model are addressed, including Skerratt and Whittington's (1992) criticisms of Nobes' cycle model. The article extends the literature with respect to a cyclical explanation of the standard setting process. The cycle pattern evident here reflects a slow and incomplete resolution of various conceptual and legal difficulties in regulating equity accounting in Australia.     

Bank Bonuses and Bailouts

This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bailouts. If there is a risk‐shifting problem, bailout expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation scheme becomes flatter and effort decreases. If both types of agency problems are present, a sufficiently large increase in bailout perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare‐maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses. In contrast, raising managers' liability can be counterproductive.     

Are Banks Finally Resolvable? A Perspective from Europe

After the global financial crisis, policymakers in many countries promised that banks should never again be bailed out using taxpayers’ money. Therefore, new regulatory measures were introduced, most importantly new bank resolution regimes like the Single Resolution Mechanism in the euro area. This paper shows that these measures contributed to a reduction in bail-out expectations and a return of market discipline in Europe. But European banks are still far from being truly resolvable. More remains to be done.     

Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership

Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large institutional investors. In the U.S. airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are 10 times larger than what is “presumed likely to enhance market power” by antitrust authorities. 1 Within‐route changes in common ownership concentration robustly correlate with route‐level changes in ticket prices, even when we only use variation in ownership due to the combination of two large asset managers. We conclude that a hidden social cost—reduced product market competition—accompanies the private benefits of diversification and good governance.     

A MARKET WITH A SOCIAL CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITY*

We model a spatial market in which the utility of each consumer is affected by the consumers who buy precisely the same product. The marginal contribution of consumers x's purchase on consumer y depends on |x–y|, which declines as |x–y| increases. Such modelling of preferences fits goods that signal a consumer's place in society—clothing styles, automobiles and jewellry are examples. For 2n + 1 firms we find the unique symmetric equilibrium and derive comparative statics on the optimal number of firms, the largest number of firms the market can support, and the behaviour of profits per firm as n increases.